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 Executive Summary & Introduction 
There is considerable international discussion that the confrontation 
between Iran and the international community over its nuclear 
programme may change in character into a major war between Iran 
and either US or Israel or both in conjunction with allies such as the 
United Kingdom. 
This study uses open source analysis to outline what the military 
option might involve if it were picked up off the table and put into 
action. The study demonstrates that an attack can be massive and 
launched with surprise rather than merely contingency plan needing 
months if not years of preparation. 
The study considers the potential for US and allied war on Iran and 
the attitude of key states. The study concludes that the US has 
made military preparations to destroy Iran’s WMD, nuclear 
energy, regime, armed forces, state apparatus and economic 
infrastructure within days if not hours of President George W. 
Bush giving the order. The US is not publicising the scale of these 
preparations to deter Iran, tending to make confrontation more 
likely. The US retains the option of avoiding war, but using its 
forces as part of an overall strategy of shaping Iran’s actions.  
• Any attack is likely to be on a massive multi-front scale but 
avoiding a ground invasion. Attacks focused on WMD 
facilities would leave Iran too many retaliatory options, leave 
President Bush open to the charge of using too little force and 
leave the regime intact. 
• US bombers and long range missiles are ready today to 
destroy 10,000 targets in Iran in a few hours.  
• US ground, air and marine forces already in the Gulf, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan can devastate Iranian forces, the regime and 
the state at short notice. 
• Some form of low level US and possibly UK military action 
as well as armed popular resistance appear underway inside 
the Iranian provinces or ethnic areas of the Azeri, Balujistan, 
Kurdistan and Khuzestan. Iran was unable to prevent sabotage 
of its offshore-to-shore crude oil pipelines in 2005. 
• Nuclear weapons are ready, but most unlikely, to be used by 
the US, the UK and Israel. The human, political and 
environmental effects would be devastating, while their 
military value is limited. 
• Israel is determined to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons 
yet has the conventional military capability only to wound 
Iran’s WMD programmes. 
• The attitude of the UK is uncertain, with the Brown 
government and public opinion opposed psychologically to 
more war, yet, were Brown to support an attack he would 
probably carry a vote in Parliament. The UK is adamant that 
Iran must not acquire the bomb. 
• Short and long term human, political and economic 
consequences of any war require innovative approaches to 
prevent the crisis becoming war. 
This study does not address Iran’s nuclear energy programmes or 
Iran’s relations with other states. It focuses on the shape that a 
‘military option’ might take if it is put into action. 
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US military, if not political, readiness for a war using minimum 
ground forces indicates that the current seeming inaction surrounding 
Iran is misleading. The United States retains the ability – despite 
difficulties in Iraq – to undertake major military operations against 
Iran. Whether the political will exists to follow such a course of 
action is known only to a few senior figures in the Bush 
administration.  
General Wesley Clark claims that he became aware of the Bush 
Administration’s instructions concerning the overthrow of the Iranian 
regime in September 2001. He states that he was told this in the 
Pentagon by a serving General holding the order in his hand.1  
“He picked up a piece of paper. And he said, “I just got this down 
from upstairs” -- meaning the Secretary of Defense’s office -- 
“today.” And he said, “This is a memo that describes how we’re 
going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and 
then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.” 
In various forms, regime change or change of orientation favouring 
the US has occurred in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Somalia in the 
ensuing six years. 
Seymour Hersh's articles claim that President Bush ordered war 
against Iran shortly after the President's re-election in 2004. His claim 
that Bush is determined not to leave Iran to a future president and that 
he has support from leading Democrats is born out by numerous  
conversations in Washington. As a senior staffer to Senator Kerry put 
it: "why should people object if we carry out disarmament 
militarily?" 
There have been reports since 2003 that war with Iran is either 
underway or in preparation. Pat Buchanan's American Conservative 
argues along with Hersh that vice-president Cheney has prepared a 
war plan for Iran including the use of nuclear weapons by summer 
2005. Scott Ritter has claimed that President Bush ordered that the 
US be ready to attack Iran at any point after June 2005 and 
Newsweek reported that the administration was considering options 
for regime change. The Atlantic Monthly concluded after conducting 
a wargame that attacking Iran was too risky. The powerpoint slides 
from that game provide a glimpse into the world of war planning. 
Their analysis assumes a large ground invasion, clearly not a 
favoured option of either Don Rumsfeld or the American public. The 
eminent investigative writer, James Bamford, has described a 
neoconservative push for regime change. 
 “We're now at the point where we are essentially on alert,” 
Lieutenant General Bruce Carlson, commander of the 8th Air Force, 
the heart of Strategic Command, said. “We have the capacity to plan 
and execute global strikes in half a day or less.” 
Under the command of Marine General James Cartwright, US Global 
Strike planning has the potential to destroy over 10,000 targets in Iran 
in one mission with "smart" conventional weapons. That number 
assumes only 100 strategic bombers with 100 bombs each. The actual 
number of planes/bombs and missiles is far larger. US government 
documents obtained by Hans Kristensen and analysed by William 
Arkin has described the development of this Global Strike capability. 
Awaiting his orders, George Bush has more than 200 strategic 
bombers (B52-B1-B2-F117A) and US Navy Tomahawk cruise 
missiles. One B2 bomber dropped 80, 500lb bombs on separate 
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targets in 22 seconds in a test flight. Using half the total force, 10,000 
targets could be attacked almost simultaneously. This strike power 
alone is sufficient to destroy all major Iranian political, military, 
economic and transport capabilities. 
Such a strike would take "shock and awe" to a new level and leave 
Iran with few if any conventional military capabilities to block the 
straights of Hormuz or provide conventional military support to 
insurgents in Iraq. If this was not enough, the latest generation of 
smart bombs, the Small Diameter Bomb, now in the US Air Force 
arsenal quadruples the number of weapons all US warplanes can 
carry. 
Placing forces on high alert does not mean that the US will use them. 
However, in an atmosphere of mounting crisis, great care must be 
taken as events move forward.  
Conventional Wisdom concerning any US attack on Iran: 
a) Any attack will be limited to suspect Weapons of Mass Destruction 
sites and associated defences. 
b) Iran will then have options to retaliate that include: 
-interference with the Straits of Hormuz and oil flows, destruction of 
Gulf oil industry infrastructure 
-fire missiles at Gulf States, Iraq bases and Israel 
-insurrection in Iraq 
-attacks by Hizbollah and Hamas on Israel 
-insurrection in Afghanistan 
-use of sleeper cells to carry out attacks in the Gulf, Europe and the 
US 
-destabilisation of Gulf states with large Shia populations 
c) This analysis is not convincing for the following reasons 
-Elementary military strategy requires the prevention of anticipated 
enemy counter-attacks. Iranian Air Force, Navy, Surface to Surface 
Missile and Air Defence systems would not be left intact. Although 
one option may be to leave regular Iranian armed forces intact and 
attack to destroy the regime including Revolutionary Guard, Basij 
and religious police. In this way regime change might be encouraged. 
-President Bush will not again lay himself open to the charge of using 
too little force 
-US policy is regime change by political means and prevention of 
nuclear weapons acquisition by all means. The only logic for restraint 
once war begins will be continued pressure on Iran to acquiesce to 
US demands through intra-war deterrence 
-Long term prevention of Iranian WMD programmes may require 
regime change and the reduction of Iran to a weak or failed state, 
since all assumptions concerning attacks on WMD sites alone 
conclude that Iran would merely be held back a few years. 
-US military preparations and current operations against Iran indicate 
a full-spectrum approach to Iran rather than one confined to WMD 
sites alone.  
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Isn’t war unthinkable? 
"There's a strong sense in the upper echelons of the White House that 
Iran is going to surface relatively quickly as a major issue - in the 
country and the world - in a very acute way," said NBC TV's Tim 
Russert after meeting the President in January 2007.2  
The political context as seen from inside the White House is that we 
are in a war as serious as the Second World War. John Bolton 
exemplified this outlook when he compared US problems in Iraq with 
the fighting with Japan after Pearl Harbour.  
There are eight arguments currently in circulation that deny the idea 
of a looming war. How do they stand up?  
First, is it likely that Iran will “do a Libya” – open all its facilities to 
United Nations inspectors, and surrender any illicit weapons along 
with its missile programmes? Such a policy would command little 
support amongst the Iranian public, let alone within the political-
religious leadership. While the United States refuses to offer any form 
of security guarantee to Iran, and indeed is actively engaged in 
attempts to undermine Iranian authorities, this possibility seems 
extremely remote. The refusal of the White House to consider an 
Iranian offer to join the Arab League Beirut Declaration and consider 
recognition of Israel indicates that at least at that time that the White 
House was not even prepared to accept such an opening from Iran. 
Second, will the European Union succeed in brokering a compromise 
in which Iran fully satisfies the International Atomic Energy Agency 
[1]’s inspectors, the United States and Israel? Privately and not so 
privately, senior US officials – such as vice-president Dick Cheney, 
newly appointed undersecretary of state Robert S Joseph, and 
onetime United Nations ambassador John Bolton – deride the EU’s 
efforts as futile.  
Third, are the military obstacles too great to permit a successful US 
attack on Iran? This may turn out to be the case. However for 
Washington – and indeed for Israel – this conclusion is literally 
unthinkable. The military strategy adopted under President Bush’s 
father, continued under President Clinton and accelerated under the 
current administration is based on the idea that the US should have 
“full spectrum dominance” of all aspects of warfare and be so far 
ahead that, in the words of the current national security strategy, any 
state will be “dissuaded” from even trying to compete. An attack on 
Iran would have to take into consideration a number of risks. But 
from the perspective of those considering a military option, Iran’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons merely makes all of these problems 
harder – and in that sense provides an additional argument for pre-
emptive action. Perhaps more importantly, none of the arguments 
made about the consequences of an attack on Iraq  – whether or not 
they proved true – influenced the decision to go to war; some, such as 
the need to provide enough troops to prevent the outbreak of disorder, 
were simply ignored.  
Fourth, it is sometimes claimed that the US does not have enough 
troops to attack Iran. But the US Army is engaged in a reorganisation 
to provide more frontline forces from headquarters and training units, 
and in any case US Air Force and Navy offensive forces are  
available for the task of attacking Iran, as they have little role in 
fighting the insurgency.  
Army overstretch from long-term deployments in Iraq is a significant 
problem, but providing forces for a short duration war (following the 
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pattern of the initial invasion of Iraq) would be much less of a 
problem. Iran has little ability for conventional military attack outside 
its own territory, allowing the US considerable scope to sit back and 
await internal developments after the type of attacks described in this 
paper. 
As John Pike of the indispensable globalsecurity.org puts it: “they 
think that they can just blow up what they want to blow up and let the 
ant-heap sort itself out afterwards.” 
Fifth, it is argued that the Iranians may have hidden their activities in 
inaccessible parts of their huge country. This is likely to be the case – 
though whether these are banned WMD programmes or permitted 
activities is an open question. However, as Seymour Hersh writes in 
the New Yorker , special forces have long been in Iran preparing the 
target list. He may be wrong on the detail, but as we discuss below 
there is considerable evidence of US action inside Iran. An aerial 
attack would not involve a ground invasion and would leave the 
Iranians to pick up the pieces. Even a limited duration ground 
incursion from Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Iraq and onto the Iranian 
coast could cause significant damage to the government, rendering 
any reconstruction of nuclear activities much more difficult. 
Sixth, could the Iranians cause immense trouble with Iraq’s Shi’a 
community and through Hezbollah with Israel? Perhaps, but how 
much stronger would Iran’s hand be if it was believed to have nuclear 
weapons? Moreover, the Iraqi Shi’a did not collectively defect to 
Tehran’s side during the Iran-Iraq war, and may be more concerned 
to develop their own interests than to be drawn into a new war. The 
present US pressure on Syria in Lebanon  is partly related to Syria’s 
alleged involvement with the Iraq insurgency, but it can also be seen 
as isolating Hezbollah and clearing the way for action against it, prior 
to or in conjunction with an attack on Iran.  
Iran’s military has considerable experience drawn from the long war 
with Iraq in the 1980s. It has, no doubt, closely watched US military 
tactics around its borders. It certainly retains some options to launch 
counter-missile attacks on Israel, as well as at the US navy and US 
bases along the Persian Gulf – from Kuwait to Bahrain and the straits 
of Hormuz. At the same time, the US armed forces have been 
preparing for this contingency for many years and it would be hard to 
be the military commander telling President Bush that Iran is just not 
“doable”. As the former counter-terror official Richard Clarke has 
written, a second-world-war-style advance by US armies to Tehran 
from the Gulf coast is not possible, but this is not part of the planning 
anyway.  
Seventh, wouldn’t a war with Iran cost too much and risk plunging 
the US into recession? US conservatives are quick to point out that as 
a percentage of gross domestic product, US military spending is 
barely half the Reagan-era peak of 6.5% of GDP; and of course, 
military spending is the one Keynesian tool of economic policy that 
conservatives permit themselves. However, as an analysis by ING 
indicates, there would be significant economic costs to a war, 
including oil at the $85 per barrel level, and further damage to an 
already weakened dollar. 
Eighth, would US public opinion and US politicians prevent the war? 
There are few who would come to the defence of what is widely seen 
as a fanatical religious state that repeatedly calls for the end of the 
state of Israel. Both Hilary Clinton and and Barak Obama are 
prepared to attack Iran if necessary, the Congress recently refused to 
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insist on being consulted before any attack on Iran. The only 
consistent opposition comes from members of past administrations, 
such as Jimmy Carter’s national Security Advisor, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, who earlier this year described an attack on Iran as 
‘unilateral war’ and ‘impeachable’, not to mention counter to US 
interests and the establishment of security in the region. 
A low intensity war already exists, nuclear weapons use is under 
active consideration but most unlikely as militarily ineffective and 
political disastrous, - major conventional strikes become “the 
moderate option”, US has power and apparent plans to implement its 
2002-2006 National Security Strategy and National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction; use Full Spectrum 
Dominance to conduct Shock and Awe and Escalation Dominance, 
minimising Iranian retaliatory capability and rendering Israeli action 
superfluous except to contain, eliminate Hizbollah and Hamas. 
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US National Security Strategies and Iran 
The Bush administration’s strategy for dealing with Iran is firmly 
based in the vision for US National Security that the administration 
has elaborated since 2002. On the launch of the administration’s first 
National Security Strategy in 2002, President Bush said that:  “The 
gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism 
and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are 
seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that 
they are doing so with determination. The United States will not 
allow these efforts to succeed. ...History will judge harshly those who 
saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have 
entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.” 
[President Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America, September 17, 2002] 
The updated version of that strategy, released in 2006, gives guidance 
both at a general level, and specifically on Iran:  
US National Security Strategy 2006 
…We may face no greater challenge from a single country than 
from Iran. For almost 20 years, the Iranian regime hid many of 
its key nuclear efforts from the international community. Yet the 
regime continues to claim that it does not seek to develop 
nuclear weapons. The Iranian regime’s true intentions are 
clearly revealed by the regime’s refusal to negotiate in good 
faith; its refusal to come into compliance with its international 
obligations by providing the IAEA access to nuclear sites and 
resolving troubling questions; and the aggressive statements of 
its President calling for Israel to “be wiped off the face of the 
earth.” The United States has joined with our EU partners and 
Russia to pressure Iran to meet its international obligations and 
provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is only for 
peaceful purposes. This diplomatic effort must succeed if 
confrontation is to be avoided.  
As important as are these nuclear issues, the United States has 
broader concerns regarding Iran. The Iranian regime sponsors 
terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; 
disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its 
people for freedom. The nuclear issue and our other concerns 
can ultimately be resolved only if the Iranian regime makes the 
strategic decision to change these policies, open up its political 
system, and afford freedom to its people. This is the ultimate 
goal of U.S. policy. In the interim, we will continue to take all 
necessary measures to protect our national and economic 
security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct. The 
problems lie with the illicit behaviour and dangerous ambition of 
the Iranian regime, not the legitimate aspirations and interests of 
the Iranian people. Our strategy is to block the threats posed by 
the regime while expanding our engagement and outreach to the 
people the regime is oppressing.  
…If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self 
defense, we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, 
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy’s attack. When the consequences of an attack with WMD 
are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by 
as grave dangers materialize. This is the principle and logic of 
pre-emption. The place of pre-emption in our national security 
strategy remains the same. We will always proceed deliberately, 
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weighing the consequences of our actions. The reasons for our 
actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just. 
This view is reinforced by the US National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): 
We will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes and 
terrorists to threaten us with the world’s most destructive 
weapons. We must accord the highest priority to the protection 
of the United States, our forces, and our friends and allies from 
the existing and growing WMD threat.(emphasis added) 
To prevent, dissuade or deny adversaries or potential 
adversaries from possessing or proliferating WMD, U.S. Armed 
Forces will be prepared to conduct offensive operations. 
(emphasis added) 
The military must also support interdiction efforts, security 
cooperation, and nonproliferation efforts. In addition, we will 
take actions to assure allies and partners that they do not need to 
possess WMD. 
This specific goal mandates an all-out effort to prevent even the 
possibility that Iran might hold nuclear weapons, as their possession 
would constrain US freedom of action in a vital region of the globe. 
 
US preparations to destroy the Iranian state as a 
regional power 
 
Summary 
 
With the introduction of Global Strike capability under US 
STRATCOM, the United States has a capacity to wage war across the 
globe from the continental United States. This includes an ability to 
hit up to 10,000 aim points almost simultaneously in a conventional 
strike. Conventional, special operations and nuclear forces are all 
integrated in Global Strike. 
 
There are a number of elements that would make up a major assault 
on Iran. These include strategic level attacks from US STRATCOM’s 
Global Strike capabilities, down to theatre-based elements. This 
report draws together and analyzes all these elements. 
 
STRATEGIC COMMAND Global Strike 
US STRATCOM’s command and control capabilities previously 
were focused primarily on the nuclear mission. Now STRATCOM is 
responsible for a full range of missions in combating nuclear and 
other WMD threats, including intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, integrated missile defence, space, network 
operations, combating weapons of mass destruction, and Global 
Strike. STRATCOM is aiming to enable the seamless delivery of 
tailored effects, anywhere and anytime, across the globe. The 
mechanism includes networking with all other combatant commands 
and their components, as well as with the Defense Department and 
other government agencies. 
 
The US has strategic forces prepared to launch massive strikes on 
Iran with hours of the order being given. Although there is clear 
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evidence that nuclear weapons use is being given serious political 
consideration, actual use is unlikely given the lack of effectiveness of 
nuclear weapons against concealed and buried targets and the 
negative political consequences of such use. The aim of the new 
Triad and the Global Strike capability developed under the Bush 
administration is stated to be making nuclear weapons use less likely. 
 
We first analyze the conventional options available under Global 
Strike. While conventional and nuclear elements are integrated in war 
planning, the authors believe that separate examination of 
conventional capabilities is necessary, both to emphasize the full 
extent of those capabilities for strategic missions – and to reduce the 
concentration on nuclear aspects of Global Strike. 
Global Conventional Strike   
Requirements for Prompt Global Strike , a US Air Force briefing 
from 2001 states that "US forces overseas have been reduced 
significantly, while rapid power projection based in the continental 
United States has become the predominant military strategy."3 To 
enable effective joint warfighting across the globe, USSTRATCOM 
has developed a capabilities based approach to its work, allowing it to 
choose from a range of conventional and nuclear military options to 
carry out its mission to deny any adversary the ability to use WMD 
against the US or its allies. 
As early as September 2004, The Times (Shreveport, LA) reported 
that departing 8th Air Force commander at Barksdale AFB, Air Force 
Lt. Gen. Bruce Carlson saying that 8th  Air Force is now “essentially 
on alert … to plan and execute Global Strikes” on behalf of 
STRATCOM. “In half a day or less, it has to come up with the means 
and methods to do that, with surveillance and intelligence before the 
mission and reconnaissance after to determine the success of the 
operation.” 4 
In December 2005, STRATCOM said a new Joint Functional 
Component Command for Space and Global Strike met requirements 
necessary to declare an initial operational capability. The 
requirements were met, it said, “following a rigorous test of 
integrated planning and operational execution capabilities during 
Exercise Global Lightning.”  This was announced in a 
USSTRATCOM press release. 
Professor Tony Cordesman believes that the US,  
“could use conventional strikes to cripple Iran’s ability to function as 
a nation in a matter of days with attacks limited to several hundred 
aim points.” 
However, global strike capabilities go far beyond this. Under the 
command of Marine General James Cartwright, US Global Strike 
planning has the potential to destroy over 10,000 targets in one 
mission with "smart" conventional weapons. This capability provides 
the backbone of US military capability against Iran. US government 
documents obtained by Hans Kristensen and analysed by William 
Arkin has described the development of this Global Strike capability. 
Exercises 
The 2005 Global Lightning exercise (an annual exercise) tested U.S. 
strategic warfare capabilities, including CONPLAN 8022 global 
strike mission, which includes options for strikes, nuclear or 
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conventional, against weapons of mass destruction facilities 
anywhere in the world.  
The Global Lightning exercises employ command and control 
personnel, controlling forces that can range from long-range bombers, 
nuclear and conventional submarines or land-based ballistic missiles 
down to special forces teams. The new command was created Aug. 9, 
2005, in an attempt to integrate broad elements of U.S. military 
power into global strike plans and operations.  
Awaiting his Global Strike orders, George Bush has more than 200 
strategic bombers (B52-B1-B2-F117A); as well as thousands of US 
Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Tomahawks are now 
programmable with multiple targets and the ability to be retargeted in 
flight up to the last moment. This greatly increases their flexibility 
and, with immediate bomb damage assessment, is likely to increase 
substantially the number of targets that can be hit by the Navy. 
 
New types of bombs 
The US B-2A carries equipped with a new earth penetrating 
conventional weapon, the Massive Ordnance penetrator. The MOP is 
a 30,000lb bomb carrying 6.000lbs of explosives and capable of 
penetrating up to 60 meters [200 feet] through 5,000 psi reinforced 
concrete.5 This puts at risk even the most hardened facilities such as 
Natanz and increases the flexibility of STRATCOM’s conventional 
strike options.6 This weapon is in the final testing stage and could be 
fitted to the B2 bomber in late 2007 or early 2008.7 
In recent years, hugely increased funding for military technology has 
taken "smart bombs" to a new level. New "bunker-busting" 
conventional bombs weigh only 250lb. According to Boeing, the 
GBU-39 small-diameter bomb "quadruples" the firepower of US 
warplanes, compared to those in use even as recently as 2003. A 
single stealth or B-52 bomber can now attack between 150 and 300 
individual points to within a metre of accuracy using the global 
positioning system.8 One B2 bomber dropped 80 500lb bombs on 
separate targets in 22 seconds in a test flight. Using just half the 
available force, 10,000 targets could be attacked almost 
simultaneously. This strike power alone is sufficient to damage 
Iranian political, military, economic and transport capabilities.  Such 
a strike would take "shock and awe" to a new level and leave Iran 
with few if any conventional military capabilities to block the 
straights of Hormuz or provide conventional military support to 
insurgents in Iraq.  
The US air force can hit the last-known position of Iranian military 
units, political leaders and supposed sites of weapons of mass 
destruction. One can be sure that, if war comes, George Bush will 
not want to stand accused of using too little force and allowing Iran 
to fight back. "Global Strike" means that, without any obvious 
signal, what was done to Serbia and Lebanon can be done 
overnight to the whole of Iran. We, and probably the Iranians, 
would not know about it until after the bombs fell. Forces that hide 
will suffer the fate of Saddam's armies, once their positions are 
known. 
 
ATTACKING KEY WMD AND OTHER TARGETS 
A ‘minimalist’ scenario for attacks would see only a few key nuclear 
facilities destroyed. This scenario is barely credible, except as a last 
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resort by Israel, since it would leave Iran too many options; its central 
government intact, the power of the Revolutionary Guards and the 
Basij untouched; and Iran’s ability to influence events in the region 
undiminished. However, such a ‘minimalist’ scenario would possibly 
delay the Iranian nuclear program by a number of years. 
These attacks would be on sites concerned with production of HEU 
and Plutonium. Targets would include Arak, Natanz, Isfahan, and 
possibly Bushehr. If such a raid were successful, this would have the 
effect of destroying known Iranian stocks of Uranium hexafluoride 
(UF6), feed stock for the enrichment facility at Natanz, and the 
material that is used to produce HEU; the Natanz uranium enrichment 
facility and the currently unfinished heavy water reactor at Arak, 
which would be used to produce plutonium, and the heavy Water 
production plant to produce fuel for the reactor. An attack on Bushehr 
would destroy a civilian facility which could be used, once 
operational, to produce HEU for a military program, if Iran was able 
to divert material from the reactor or its waste. 
Of these facilities, Natanz and Arak are in relatively isolated areas, 
while the Isfahan facility is in a lightly populated area, but still less 
than ten miles from the heart of this ancient city. The Bushehr 
reactor, as yet unfinished, sits 20 miles south of the city of Bushehr 
itself. This city contains significant air force and navy bases and 
facilities, as well as air defences.  
Conventional attacks on Arak and Natanz would likely have little 
effect on the civilian population. Conventional strikes on Isfahan 
would carry a small risk of civilian casualties. Such a strike on 
Bushehr, however, would carry a significant risk of harm to the 
civilian population, either from stray bombs falling in populated 
areas, or from air combat above Bushehr and the surrounding area. 
It is likely that the United States would select a much more wide-
ranging set of attacks on Iran, since they have strategic interests in 
destroying Iranian military power that go far beyond preventing 
Iranian acquisition of the bomb. The United States could not achieve 
these wider objectives through this scenario, which renders it 
extremely unlikely.  
 
Attacking a Wider Range of Nuclear Facilities 
A broader scenario might see attacks on a wider range of nuclear 
facilities, yet stopping short of massive attacks against Iranian 
military infrastructure in general, again we consider this scenario 
unlikely. In this scenario, the president would order attacks on many 
or all of the 23 or more known nuclear sites in Iran. Strikes may also 
be ordered against other research sites at universities across Iran, 
linked to the nuclear program. 
The advantage of such an operation would be that it would likely 
cause much more severe damage than the limited attacks to the 
nuclear program. However, there would still be no guarantee that all 
uranium enrichment facilities were destroyed, or indeed that all 
nuclear sites were hit. Because many of the sites to be hit are inside 
cities, on campuses, close to residential zones or in industrial areas, 
the risks of civilian casualties would also be greater in this scenario. 
This scenario would add to potential risks, without dramatically 
increasing the likelihood of delaying the Iranian program. Israel 
would be very unlikely to carry out a mission of this magnitude, and 
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examining US doctrine for air war and counterproliferation leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that the United States would see no 
benefit in the restraint of this middle scale option. This view is 
reinforced by the war-planning and military capabilities available to 
the United States, and the wider objectives the US is pursuing in the 
region. 
 
Air Attacks on Wider Military and Government Targets 
Once an air assault on Iran began, it might include a huge range of 
targets from the outset under the Shock and Awe approach or reach 
out to more and more targets in a policy known as Escalation 
Dominance or in other language, ‘mission creep. This would lead to 
an ever increasing target set, moving from nuclear and other WMD 
facilities, through strikes on conventional military targets to reduce 
threats to US forces in theatre, to the destruction of leadership targets 
in order to degrade the government’s ability to strike back at the US 
forces and allies.9 
US Air Force doctrine for conducting and bombing campaign 
requires  attack on air defences, as well as command and 
communications faculties, to reduce the risk to forces carrying out the 
core mission of destruction of nuclear facilities.  
There would be provision for assaults to prevent Iran striking back in 
any significant manner. These would involve US forces in Iraq and 
Iran, protection for the Straits of Hormuz and oil facilities in the Gulf 
States, disruption of Revolutionary Guard and other elite forces most 
loyal to the current government.10  
A recent analysis by Anthony Cordesman of CSIS , a senior figure in 
the Washington DC national security scene, demonstrates in bullet 
point form how US options could move from simple targeting of 
WMD ‘chokepoints’ to a massive attack on WMD, other military and 
civilian infrastructure this is included as an endnote.11 
In short, once a war begins, given the doctrinal and political 
framework within which the US military operates, the attacks would 
inevitably escalate. Given requirements to neutralize Iranian abilities 
to resist in US military doctrine, and policy interests to prevent Iran 
acting as a major regional power in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel and the 
Gulf to constrain US freedom of action, the obvious course of action 
is to plan for a series of attacks by the full range of US forces 
available from the beginning.  This study expands on these 
considerations of a large scale air and missile attack to include 
analysis of US Army, Marine Corps and Special Operations 
Command Forces and political and intelligence operations.  
This wider form of air attack would be the most likely to delay the 
Iranian nuclear program for a sufficiently long period of time to meet 
the administration’s current counterproliferation goals. It would also 
be consistent with the possible goal of employing military action is to 
overthrow the current Iranian government, since it would severely 
degrade the capability of the Iranian military (in particular 
revolutionary guards units and other ultra-loyalists) to keep armed 
opposition and separatist movements under control. It would also 
achieve the US objective of neutralizing Iran as a power in the region 
for many years to come. 
However, it is the option that contains the greatest risk increased 
global tension and hatred of the United States. The US would have 
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few, if any allies for such a mission beyond Israel (and possibly the 
UK). Once undertaken, the imperatives for success would be 
enormous. 
 
SPECIAL FORCES ROLE IN COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
IN IRAN 
 
Special Operations Forces of the United States play a key role in 
counterproliferation missions including operations discussed under 
the “Scud Hunt” section below. For such purposes, they come under 
the command of USSTRATCOM which has full authority over anti-
WMD missions.  
In the case of an attack on Iran, the reality of Special Force 
Operations could be to add 
helicopter-carried troops to 
search and destroy with 
demolition engineering suspect 
WMD facilities in conjunction 
with air and missile 
bombardments. A parallel role 
discussed below would be assist 
internal uprising in Iran before, 
during and after a major 
conventional attack. 
The need for more than Air 
Force bombs to destroy the best 
protected bunkers can be 
illustrated by this picture of the intact lower floors of Saddam 
Hussein’s bunker in Baghdad which was subject to heavy US air 
attack. 
  
The importance of this mission for Special Forces has grown since 
9/11, but already in the late 1990s, counterproliferation was listed in 
DoD documents as the primary mission of special forces: 
 
SOF's inherent capabilities and international activities places 
them in an ideal position to foster international cooperation 
needed to stem or prevent NBC smuggling and terrorism, while 
still pursuing the means to detect, deter, neutralize or effectively 
destroy WMD and related infrastructure, if necessary. This 
mission continues to grow in its significance for SOF and our 
nation.12 
 
Special forces can play a unique role in the fight against the 
proliferation and use of nuclear and other WMD. The flexibility of 
placing special forces units into such missions is said to be one of 
their most valuable characteristics. DoD has described their use: 
 
SOF direct action capabilities contribute to deterrence and 
destruction options by providing a precision strike capability 
against weapons, storage facilities, and command and control 
nodes. SOF special reconnaissance capabilities can contribute 
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to the defense against WMD threats by providing real-time 
intelligence unavailable from other sources.13  
In Iran, SOCOM may already being used to carry out intelligence 
missions (as described elsewhere in this report), and could, in the 
event of open hostilities, be used to attack facilities around the 
country.  
A major advantage of Global Strike lies in the ability to carry out a 
wide scale operation without the need for numerous early 
preparations or deployment of forces into the region to be attacked. It 
is reasonable to posit that forces stationed in the Gulf region will also 
be used during an attack, both to allow extra waves of attacks while 
global strike forces rearm, and to disrupt Iranian forces as they 
attempt to retaliate. 
 
Theatre Operations 
Summary 
American military operations for a major conventional war with Iran 
could be implemented any day. They extend far beyond targeting 
suspect WMD facilities and will enable President Bush to destroy 
Iran's military, political and economic infrastructure overnight using 
conventional weapons. 
Iran has a weak air force and anti aircraft capability, almost all of it is 
20-30 years old and it lacks modern integrated communications. Not 
only will these forces be rapidly destroyed by US air power, but 
Iranian ground and air forces will have to fight without protection 
from air attack. 
British military sources stated on condition of anonymity, that "the 
US military switched its whole focus to Iran" from March 2003. It 
continued this focus even though it had infantry bogged down in 
fighting the insurgency in Iraq. 
 
Day-to-day war plans 
On the shelf, the United States has several contingency plans for 
waging war with Iran. These exist on levels from a major war plan 
(Conplan 1025), down to regional plans for more limited attacks on 
Iran.  
Conplan 1025 is a major war plan for a response to aggression by 
Iran. It includes a variety of options for smaller scenario wars, for 
example in the Straits of Hormuz, around the Caspian Sea, or 
elsewhere. Implementation of this option is a massive undertaking, 
comparable to or larger than the first Gulf War. This large and 
unwieldy option is unlikely to be pursued, and would indeed be 
unnecessary with modern US capabilities.  
As Bill Arkin writes “.. [b]eyond the generic major Iran war plan ..  
there are various contingencies directly associated with the Iraq war 
plan and U.S. presence in Iraq. For instance, to mount limited cross 
border attacks to eliminate terrorist "support infrastructure," that is, 
Iranian capabilities and infrastructure that are supporting the 
development and shipment of IEDs and other ordnance being used in 
Iraq.”14 
A major attack, although on a more limited basis than invasion and 
occupation of Iran, could be undertaken under Conplan 8022, the 
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Global Strike option, created specifically to counter the use or threat 
of use of WMD against US forces or allies.  
Conplan 8022 could be put into effect together with regional 
operational plans for limited war with Iran, such as  Oplan 1002-04, 
for an attack on the western province of Kuzhestan),15 or Oplan 1019 
which deals with preventing Iran from closing the Straits of Hormuz, 
and therefore keeping open oil lanes vital to the US economy. 
The existence of these plans is neither surprising, nor a declaration of 
war. It does mean that the US military has the ability to implement a 
Presidential order to go to war against Iran quickly, should such an 
order come. We analyze the possible elements of an attack against 
Iran in this report. 
 
From day-to-day to ready today 
The US army, navy, air force and marines have all prepared battle 
plans and spent four years building bases and training. Admiral 
Fallon, the new head of US Central Command, has inherited 
computerised plans under the name TIRANNT (Theatre Iran Near 
Term). The Bush administration has made much of sending three 
aircraft carriers to the Gulf. But it is a small part of the preparations. 
A pre-9/11 CENTCOM training manual called for using 500 F15 and 
F16 warplanes in a new Gulf War. Easily that number can be placed 
on airbases all around Iran along with helicopter forces. The whole of 
Iran is within 30 minutes flying time from some US base or carrier, 
even with restricted use of bases amongst its allies on the Arabian 
peninsular. 
Post 9/11, the US Navy can put six carriers into battle at a month's 
notice. Carriers in the region could quickly be joined by others in 
standby in the Atlantic and Pacific but not noticed by the media. Each 
carrier force includes hundreds of cruise missiles aboard surface ships 
and submarines. As of July 2007 these included 3 Carrier Strike 
Forces, the Reagan, Nimitz and Enterprise each including a marine 
aircraft carrier. 
The Marines are not all tied down fighting in Iraq. Several Marine 
forces are assembling in the Gulf, each with its own aircraft carrier. 
These carrier forces can each conduct a version of the D-Day 
landings. They come with landing craft, tanks, jump-jets, thousands 
of troops and hundreds more cruise missiles. Their task is to destroy 
Iranian forces able to attack oil tankers and to secure oilfields and 
installations. They have trained for this mission since the Iranian 
revolution of 1979 as is indicated in this battle map of Hormuz 
illustrating an advert for combat training software. 
The marine carriers are the spearhead of highly flexible Marine 
Expeditionary Forces of up to 50,000 troops with their own tanks, air 
force and 30 days supplies on board. They include Maritime 
PrePositioning Forces. 
Maritime Prepositioning Force16 
“Sixteen MSC prepositioning ships are especially configured to 
transport supplies for the U.S. Marine Corps. Known as the Maritime 
Prepositioning Force, the ships were built or modified beginning in 
the mid-1980s and are forward-deployed to the western Pacific 
Ocean, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. The ships 
contain nearly everything the Marines need for initial military 
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operations -- from tanks and ammunition to food and water and from 
fuel to spare parts and engine oil. 
The ships are organized into three squadrons: MPS Squadron One, 
usually located in the Mediterranean Sea and eastern Atlantic; MPS 
Squadron Two, usually located at Diego Garcia; and MPS Squadron 
Three, normally in the Guam/Saipan area. In addition to Marine 
Corps designated ships, MPS squadron staffs also oversee all other 
prepositioning ships in their geographic operating areas.” 
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“The Scud Hunt”: suppressing Iranian missile capabilities 
 
The US effort to defeat Saddam Hussein’s missile threat in the 1991 
came to be known as the Scud Hunt. An assessment of Iranian missile 
capabilities reveals an ability to attack targets along its borders and to 
some states on the Southern Gulf coast. US efforts to defeat the threat 
include efforts to attack missiles before they can be launched and in 
flight.  
The effort to attack launchers is shared across the US military and 
would involve attacks on many suspect but not actual sites.  Defense 
against missile attack is conducted by missile and aircraft attacking 
launch sites and aircraft attempting to shoot down missiles 
immediately after launch in the short “boost phase” before they gain 
full speed but after a strong infra-re-heat signal can be detected from 
rocket motors. The Navy Aegis system and the US Army’s Patriot 
systems are designed to destroy missiles in flight. Their effectiveness 
against ballistic missiles is disputed.  
It is important to note that the impact of Iranian 
conventional missile attacks may be compared to those by 
Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf war and by both Iran 
and Iraq in their decade long war in the 1980s in the so-
called War of the Cities”. The use of missiles, even when 
equipped with chemical warheads did not have a decisive 
effect on the outcome of the war. It is important not to 
confuse Iranian ability to attack certain targets with the 
ability to affect the outcome of the battle. Indeed even the 
loss of a US air craft carrier could be as likely to inflame 
US opinion as to cause a withdrawal if Americans feel 
sufficiently threatened.17 
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Overview      Range Charts Source: globalsecurity.org 
Designation Stages Propellant Range IOC Inventory Alternate Name 
Mushak-120 1 solid 130 km ?  Iran-130, Nazeat 10 
Mushak-160 1 solid 160 km   Fateh-110 / NP-110 
Mushak-200 1 solid 200 km   Zelzal-2 
Shahab-1 1 liquid 300 km 1995 50-300 Scud-B 
Shahab-2 1 liquid 500 km  50-150 Scud-C  
Shahab-3 1 liquid 1,300 km 2002 25-100 Zelzal-3 
Shahab-4 2 liquid 2,000 km  0  
IRIS 1 liquid / 
solid 
3000 km 2005   Shahab 3D  
X-55 
LACM 
1 jet engine 3,000 km 2001 12  
Shahab-5 3 liquid 5,500 km  0  
Shahab-6 3 liquid 10,000 km  0  
The “Littoral War”- Hormuz and Khuzestan 
 “We had a discussion in policy planning about actually mounting an 
operation to take the oilfields in the Middle East, internationalize 
them, put them under some sort of U.N. trusteeship and administer 
the revenues and the oil accordingly. That’s how serious we thought 
about it.” Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, Chief of Staff to Secretary of 
State Colin Powell.18 ??Context 
 
The standard contingency planning in Oplan 1002-4 for an invasion 
of Khuzestan has had more than theoretical consideration. That even 
the supposedly liberal realist part of the administration of George W, 
Bush had these discussions points to the routine consideration at the 
political level as well as in contingency planning for military action to 
secure Middle East oil. Such a coastal, or in modern military 
parlance, ‘littoral’ war would form a major part of any war with Iran. 
At least since the “tanker war” of the 1980s, the US, its allies and Iran 
have watched each other extremely closely with a view to future 
potential combat. 
Iranian capability 
The Iranian navy is very small and vulnerable. There are three areas 
to examine. Shore to ship missiles, speed boat swarms and human 
torpedoes. Numerous studies of Iranian naval strategy emphasise anti 
ship missiles and “swarms” of missile firing speed-boats.19  
Nevertheless the asymmetric threat from small boats is formidable. 
Every night many hundred small boats pass between Iran and its 
neighbours on the Southern shores of the Gulf. Wargaming has 
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shown what can happen if Iran chooses to ‘redcell’, or strike first in 
wargame jargom: 
 
On the second day of the battle he put a fleet of small boats up 
against the aircraft carrier battle group to track the ships. Then 
without warning, he bombarded them in an hour-long fusillade 
of cruise missiles . At the end of the surprise attack, sixteen ships 
lay on the bottom. Had the 'game' been real instead of just a 
'game' twenty thousand servicemen and women would have been 
killed before their own army had fired a shot. 'As the 
commander, I'm sitting there and I realize the First Team had 
said that they were going to adopt a policy of preemption' Van 
Riper says, ' So I struck first. We had done all the calculations on 
how many cruise missiles their ships could handle, so we simply 
launched more than that, from many different directions, from 
offshore and onshore, from air, from sea. We probably got half 
of their ships. We picked the ones we wanted. The aircraft 
carrier, the biggest cruisers. There were six amphibious ships. 
We knocked out five of them.20 
 
Shore to ship missiles 
Iran deploys several forms of imported and domestic ship to ship and 
shore to ship missiles. These are detailed in such works as the 
Military Balance of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
Writing that emphasises the threat posed by these weapons rarely 
discusses the effectiveness of US and allied defences. 
In 1991 a Seadart missile fired from the HMS Gloucester destroyed 
an incoming Silkworm anti-ship missile fired from one of Iraq's 
shore-based missile launchers.21 The Silkworm is a Chinese missile 
sold also to Iran, the British Sea Dart is a 35 year old system. It is 
reasonable to assume that current continuously upgraded and modern 
US and allied naval Aegis, Phalanx and Sea Sparrow anti-missile 
systems will be quite to very effective against Iranian anti-ship 
missiles. 
Mines 
Iran has a significant ability to mine the Gulf and the US is somewhat 
reliant on allied navies for anti-mine operations.  Pre-emption of 
Iranian launch of mines will be a high priority for US forces in the 
region. 
Speed boat swarms 
These are much featured in TV footage of Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard units and played a significant part in the “Tanker War”. Since 
then US Navy ships have added small calibre rapid firing cannon and 
canister air burst shells to the main guns, providing a capability 
comparable to the effect of grape shot on cavalry horses a century 
ago.  
Human torpedoes are hard to detect but also slow and hard to use 
against moving ships. They can be considered a significant if decisive 
threat. 
US Navy and Marines have one main mission and other potential 
missions in any war with Iran along the Gulf.  The first is to if 
possible pre-empt and otherwise defeat Iranian attempts to interfere 
with oil production and shipping in the Gulf, other missions may 
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include seizure of Iranian oil assets, destruction of military, political 
and infrastructure targets and support for anti-regime elements inside 
Iran. 
The US would likely have to reduce the Marine presence in Al Anbar 
to support large scale Marine operations in the Northern and Southern 
Gulf. 
US Marines are organised to operate in units that can expand from 
2,000 men in Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard a group of ships 
forming an Expeditionary Strike Force to a full Marine Expeditionary 
Force of 50,000 troops using far more equipment, supplies and 
landing craft already at sea or based in locations such as Diego Garcia 
in the Indian Ocean. These Marine forces are equipped to be self-
sufficient for 30 days and include tanks, helicopters and Harrier jump 
jet warplanes. 
In mid 2007 the US had some 40 warships operating off the Iranian 
coast.  These included aircraft carriers, marine aircraft carriers, 
cruisers, destroyers, frigates and submarines. Aside from the carrier 
born aircraft and helicopters the other vessels carry many hundreds of 
Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles. 
The Gulf area of operations can broadly be separated into two: the 
area around the Straits of Hormuz and the oil-rich coastal waters off 
Khuzestan in the northern Gulf, including Bushehr and, to the South, 
Bandar Kangan.  
HORMUZ22 
Simple statements that Iran could block the straits conceal the reality 
that this is a broad and deep waterway. Studies conducted by the US 
Marines indicate that a Marine Division of more than 20,000 men 
would be required for a ground invasion of the northern coast of the 
straits.   
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This size of force would be required to execute the operations 
depicted in the following typical diagrams from US military 
exercises. The location and enemy situation for the scenario was built 
upon the Straits of Hormuz scenario used by both the Marine Corps 
Command and Staff College and Amphibious Warfare School. 
 
Far smaller forces would be required for the suppression of Iranian 
military capabilities and the possible occupation of Iranian islands if 
there was no major land invasion. One combined Navy Carrier Strike 
Group and Marine Expeditionary Strike Group might be sufficient to 
secure the straits. These two types of forces have been exercising 
together routinely prior to deployments to the region. 
As part of a general assault on Iran, a combined Carrier/Marine Strike 
Group would be able to attack more than 1,000 targets at long range 
using 70 F18, Harrier AV8 and other aircraft along with many 
Tomahawk and Harpoon ship to shore missiles. Naval gunfire, marine 
attack helicopters, tanks and artillery would also be available for the 
close in fight. 
The suppression of Iranian military power would not involve a 
ground invasion of the mainland but would likely include raiding 
parties designed, for example, to ensure the destruction of Iranian 
shore based anti-ship missiles.   
The occupation of Iranian Islands would be an attractive proposition 
militarily and politically to the United States.  Such operations would 
limit long-term Iranian ability to interfere in the area and provide US 
bases in the area from which to control the seas.  
The frequent assertion that Iranian revolutionary Guards have 
hundreds of jetties along the Gulf from which they can launch suicide 
speed boat missions has likely added all know Iranian civilian 
transport and fishing ports and vessels to a pre-emptive target list.  
Although the northern Gulf coast is a complex and long coastline, 
modern target acquisition imagery and air and missile capability 
would permit very great destruction along a long coastline from long 
range with raiding parties supported by these powerful forces.23 
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Khuzestan 
The Khuzestan region presents one of the most formidable strategic 
problems for both the US and Iran, containing as it does a large part 
of the world’s oil and gas production and reserves. The geopolitical 
and financial aspects of these issues cannot be a analysed in detail in 
a paper of this sort.  However, for the US, Iran and the international 
community, short term crises of supply and oil price volatility need to 
be set against the strategic prize of long-term control of these 
resources. For the US, the political complexion of any post-war 
government in the region and in Tehran would have to be key 
consideration and this is discussed in outline in the section 
concerning US operations inside Iran below. 
The US will at least commit a combined US Navy Carrier Strike and 
Marine Expeditionary Strike Force to defeat Iranian ability to 
interfere with shipping on the Shat Al Arab and southwards. One 
objective will be to secure Iranian offshore facilities from which 
attacks can be made on shipping in the Gulf. The partially completed 
nuclear reactor at Bushehr on the coast would be destroyed.   
There may be some consideration of a ground assault and occupation 
of parts of Khuzestan, partly because of its oil and gas reserves and 
partly to secure the waterways from attack.  The US assessment of the 
attitude of the local population will be a decisive factor. This US 
Navy news story provides a snapshot of US forces now in the 
region.24 
 
 
THE IRAQ-IRAN BORDER  
Summary 
US Army units now in Iraq have the ability to destroy hundreds of 
military, political and economic infrastructure targets hundreds of 
kilometers from the Iraqi border. The ability to carry out the prompt 
elimination and demoralization of Iranian Army, Pasdaran, Basij, 
police and religious units raises the prospect that the Iranian regime in 
Tehran would soon face an inability to control its Western provinces, 
so that oppressed regional ethnic groups, especially in Kurdish Iran 
would find greater freedom of manoeuvre. The fate that befell the 
Iraqi armed forces in 1991 and 2003 could be visited upon Iran, but 
without the use of invading tank forces. Only concealed forces that 
took no action could be expected to survive long. 
IRANIAN AND US CAPABILITIES 
The Iranian Army and Revolutionary Guard units have remained 
concentrated along the Iran-Iraq border since the end of the war with 
Iraq. These ground force have strong defensive positions reliant on 
the mountainous terrain. However, these forces are vulnerable to US 
air and missile attack in known stationary positions and while US 
airborne target acquisition radars and missile systems designed to 
defeat Soviet tanks in Germany and refined in operations in the 1991 
Gulf War, the NATO Kosovo campaign and in ongoing operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan are now very capable.  Any significant 
concentration of military vehicles would be rapidly destroyed. 
In the provinces of Southern Iraq conditions are radically different, 
the Iraqi population is Shiva, partially sympathetic to Iran, the terrain 
becomes flat desert and flood plains the US forces are not present in 
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strength. The British who had occupied the area are minimising their 
presence to Basra airport.   
A key assessment in any war with Iran concerns Basra province and 
the Kuwait border. It is likely that Iran and its sympathizers could 
take control of population centres and interrupt oil supplies, if it was 
in their interest to do so.  However it is unlikely that they could make 
any sustained effort against Kuwait or to interrupt supply lines north 
from Kuwait to central Iraq.  US firepower is simply too great for any 
Iranian conventional force. 
Facing the dozen or more Iranian army divisions and Revolutionary 
Guard Units, the US Army has extremely powerful and virtually 
unused missile units already in Iraq that can attack targets up to 300 
km inside Iran without warning. 
The US Army’s mobile Multiple Launch Rocket System basic system 
can fire 1,400 cluster munitions at targets 300 kilometres every 
fifteen minutes and 8,000 cluster munitions every fifteen minutes to 
32km. Its guided weapons version can deliver a 12 “70 kilometre 
sniper shot” in the same period of time. This GMLRS XM30 rocket 
has a GPS (Global Positioning System) and inertial guidance 
package. The system can also fire two Army Tactical Missile System 
Block IA missile extends the range to more than 300km by reducing 
the sub-munition payload and adding GPS guidance. 
 
 
 
Thus, these highly accurate ballistic missiles can attack targets up to 
300 km inside Iran. Well known locations such as the nuclear 
research facility at Arak and the Northern city of Tabriz are within 
easy range of US Army ballistic missiles now in Iraq. It is hard to 
imagine that any US attack on Iran would not make use of these 
forces. US Marine units have less powerful equipment and are mostly 
operating in Western Iraq (Anbar) away from the Iranian border. 
US Army aviation includes the Apache attack helicopters, whose 
pilots have now acquired considerable fighting experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Helicopters have proved vulnerable to insurgent small 
arms fire, however they have a formidable capability to destroy 
enemy vehicles and bases from outside the range of the defenders 
weapons. 
The US Air Force has established major air bases on the site of 
former Iraqi air force bases including Baghdad, Balad, Kirkuk and 
Tallil. US war planes carry out few missions against the insurgents 
and, since the initial march on Baghdad in 2003 have engaged in little 
fighting.  The US keeps secret the deployment of US tactical air 
power in the region. However, a number of facts are clear.  First, the 
US Air Force how has an “expeditionary” structure with the 
equipment to move the support services for combat air bases 
thousands of missiles in a short period of time. The relevant combat 
aircraft include F16 and  F15 ground attack fighters able to reach 
their target inside Iran in around 30 minutes flying time.  It is 
reasonable to assume that Iranian intelligence would observe major 
increases in the stationing of these aircraft in Iraq and that either 
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sufficient forces are retained in Iraq over time, or they would have to 
be flown in after the initial attacks if surprise were not to be lost. 
Second, the capability of the F16 and F15 fighters has increased since 
2003.  First, the entire service has improved in capabilities by being 
engaged in real fighting rather than exercises.  Second, new 
technologies have been added that make it easier for pilots to interact 
with ground forces and add to the lethality of the weapons they carry.  
In particular the  110 kilogram GBU 39 Small Diameter Bomb is said 
by Boeing to quadruple the combat power of US war planes because 
planes can carry so many of these weapons, 12 on an F15. This 
weapon can penetrate 2 metres of concrete before exploding and has 
an accuracy of less than one metre. This makes all but the deepest 
buried bunkers and military installations vulnerable to a weapon no 
larger than that carried a century ago by bi-planes of the European 
colonial forces. 
The Caspian Front 
The UK joined with the United States in preparing invasion scenarios 
for a war with Iran. British officers joined US personnel at Fort 
Belvoir near Washington DC in 2004, for the Hotspur 2004 exercise. 
This exercise was part of the planning under the TIRANNT or 
‘theater Iran near term’ initiative, led by the US Central Command. 
This exercise was reported in the Guardian, and also in the 
Washington Post in 2006. 
The exercise focused on the Caspian Sea region, vital for oil and gas 
supplies. The UK contributed a brigade-sized formation to a US-led 
force for exercise purposes. According to the UK Ministry of 
Defence, the exercise was the main focus of UK-US military planning 
cooperation in 2004. This operation was also significant in that it 
involved significant exercising of joint warfighting capabilities, 
bringing together expeditionary units of the army, marines, navy and 
air force. Defense News covered this exercise at the time.  
The country targeted in the exercise was, according to the Guardian, 
named Korona, but maps of the Caspian Sea region with actual 
borders were used.  Scott Ritter, the former marines intelligence 
officer and Iraq arms inspector, has been talking about a pending or 
possible invasion of Iran for several years. His point about the 
Caspian is: 
And if you go to the School of Advanced Military Studies in Fort 
Leavenworth, Kan., as I have several times, you'll see the maps 
on the wall clearly indicate an American interest in pushing 
forces into Azerbaijan. Why? It neighbors Iran. Why is that 
important? The shortest route to Tehran is down the Caspian 
Sea coast, [where] the Army is planning an incursion right 
now.
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This demonstrates the importance of the US-UK Hotspur Exercise. 
Hotspur was part of a series of exercises and planning processes 
under TIRANNT, all of which is feeding into contingency planning 
for a possible war with Iran in the near to medium term (Hotspur was 
set in 2015).  
Ritter has also described increasing contacts between US Special 
Forces and Azerbaijani forces, and a gradual build-up of logistics and 
infrastructure in Azerbaijan, actions which would allow the use to 
exploit links between Azeris in Azerbaijan and Iran in the event of a 
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Hotspur-style assault. These contacts are also described by other 
specialists, link although not well covered in the general media. 
Radio Free Europe has described US engagement in Azerbaijan thus: 
Despite reports predicting a "new" U.S. military engagement in 
Azerbaijan, in reality, there has been a significant American 
military mission there for at least three years, comprised of two 
components. The first component was the creation of the 
"Caspian Guard," an initiative involving both Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan focusing on maritime and border security in the 
Caspian Sea. The Caspian Guard initiative incorporates 
defensive mission areas, including the surveillance of Caspian 
airspace, borders, and shipping. It encourages greater 
coordination and cooperation in counter-proliferation efforts by 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. This effort was further bolstered by 
a $20 million program launched in July 2004 and implemented 
by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency to train the 
Azerbaijan Maritime Border Guard. Additional training and 
combined exercises were also provided by U.S. Navy SEALS to 
Azerbaijan's 41st Special Warfare Naval Unit in June 2004.  
The second component was the establishment of several 
"Cooperative Security Locations," tactical facilities with pre-
positioned stock that provide contingency access but, unlike a 
traditional base, have little or no permanent U.S. military 
presence. These locations are designed to increase the mobility 
of U.S. military forces and, most importantly, facilitate counter-
proliferation missions along Azerbaijan's southern border with 
Iran and northern borders with Georgia and Daghestan. 
(emphasis added) 
In line with the U.S. military need to project military power 
rapidly, the U.S. presence in Azerbaijan may be further 
expanded from the existing Cooperative Security Locations to 
Forward Operating Sites, host-country "warm sites" endowed 
with a limited military presence and capable of hosting 
rotational forces. These forward operating sites can also serve 
as centers for bilateral and regional training. 26 
The reference to counter proliferation missions might refer to 
smuggling, its most obvious meaning is to refer to the main 
proliferator in the region, Iran itself. The increased US involvement 
in the country is important, since Azerbaijan has ruled out 
participation in an invasion of Iran, but has pointedly not ruled out the 
US using Azerbaijani territory for such an undertaking. Azerbaijan’s 
parliament has ruled against foreign bases in their country, but these 
facilities are not called bases, a term interpreted to mean permanent 
foreign presence. Azerbaijan needs US assistance in it ongoing 
dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as with 
development of oil and gas resources, and as a bulwark against 
Russian pressure in the region. 
Afghanistan 
The United States has also been increasing its military infrastructure 
on Iran’s eastern border in Afghanistan. Asia Times reported in 2005 
that: 
The United States is beefing up its military presence in 
Afghanistan, at the same time encircling Iran. Washington will 
set up nine new bases in Afghanistan in the provinces 
of Helmand, Herat, Nimrouz, Balkh, Khost and Paktia.27 
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The most significant of these for operations in Iran is Herat. The US 
Army Corps of Engineers began construction of a base for a brigade 
sized force in 2005, this facility is now operational. The Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) constructed some 71 structures including 
barracks, administration and support facilities. The base has its own 
airfield and US forces state that, despite being only 45 miles from 
Iran, its main purpose is to train Afghan National Army units. The 
base was described in 2005 by Asia Times as: 
Construction work has already begun on the NATO base in 
Herat, under the surveillance of Italian troops stationed there as 
part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 
contingent of peacekeepers in the country. Currently, about 
8,000 of these soldiers from 36 countries serve in Kabul and nine 
provinces north of the capital. The new base in Herat is expected 
to be big enough for about 10,000 troops, will feature a military 
airbase, and will act as NATO's headquarters in the country. 
There are also about 18,000 US troops in Afghanistan.28 
This base gives the United States a staging post close to Iran. Using 
the Herat base, the US Air Force could disrupt Iranian air defences 
easily, and dominate the skies of eastern Iran as well as sending in 
helicopter born Airborne and Special Forces Units. 
Destabilising the Iranian state, Towards a 
Federal Iran? 
Understandably, open source information on the nature of special 
forces operations is both hard to come by, and notoriously unreliable. 
However, there is enough ‘chatter’ in the media concerning ongoing 
hidden warfare between Iran, the US, UK, Israel and Iraq, for us to be 
sure that some operations are underway. Michael Ledeen of the 
American Enterprise Institute organised an event in 2005 supporting 
the idea that Iran should be federalised. Unrealistic today, such an 
idea gives encouragement to those in Iranian legitimately resisting 
repression and prepares the ground for a model of post-war Iran to 
sell to the US elite and Iranians alike. 
Seymour Hersh has indicated on several occasions in the New Yorker 
that US special forces operations are taking place inside Iran. The 
Financial Times reports that the US Marine Corps has completed a 
study of the potential interaction of Iran’s regional populations with 
possible military interventions. As the Guardian reports the internal 
unrest in provinces including Balujistan provides more opportunities 
for the US. There are of bombings against government targets in 
several Iranian provinces in recent years and of brutal Iranian 
repression of political dissidents and those breaching the Sharia. 
One strategy for regime change in Iran involves both support for 
democracy and the development of a new federal Iran. Condoleeza 
Rice has just added another $75 million to the existing propaganda 
effort that includes satellite TV aimed at Iran. The movements in Iran 
may feel torn between wanting assistance to resist regime repression 
and accepting outside help that jeopardises their safety now and at 
best may offer the chaos of Iraq as a post-war environment. 
Azeri Iran 
In the northern Azerbaijani region of Iran, Amnesty International and 
EU parliamentarians have been trying to reduce Tehran’s repression 
of the local community. The following report on the Azeri region of 
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northern Iran from 2006 is instructive and discusses meetings 
between representatives of Iranian minorities and the Bush 
Administration: 
Unrest among Iranian Azeris began in late May, when protests over 
an official newspaper’s caricature of Azerbaijan as a cockroach led 
to the deaths of 24 people and the arrests of hundreds of activists 
demanding an expansion of Azeri cultural rights.  
 
On June 30, an attempt to hold rally at Bazz (Babek) Castle in 
northwestern Iran to commemorate the birthday of the Azeri national 
hero, Babek, who organized resistance against Arab invaders in the 
9th century, prompted a new wave of arrests in a number of Iranian 
cities.  
 
On the eve of the march, Amnesty International issued a special 
report which urged the Iranian government to allow the rally 
participants to assemble freely, and demanded the release of event 
organizers who had been arrested earlier. The same was demanded 
by 19 European parliament members on July 22 who urged the 
Iranian government to disclose where the prisoners are being held, 
and to allow them unrestricted access to their families, attorneys of 
their choice, interpreters and medical treatment.  
 
Saleh Kamrani, a lawyer and human rights activist, is one of the 
hundreds of ethnic Azeris arrested after the May protests. Kamrani 
was charged with actions against the Iranian state. Kamrani’s wife, 
Mina, states that her husband has not been allowed to meet with his 
lawyer since his arrest, and reports that bond for Kamrani has been 
set at $50,000, an amount Mina Kamrani described as 10 times the 
usual rate.  
 
Mohtaram Mohammadi, the wife of another prisoner -- Hasan 
Rashidi, director of the Azerbaijan House in the northern Iranian city 
of Tabriz, who was arrested the day after the Bazz rally -- told 
EurasiaNet that her husband has been charged with working for 
foreign intelligence. "He was just demanding his rights," she said. 
Iranian Azeris, who comprise roughly 25 percent of Iran’s population 
of almost 69 million people.  
 
Reflecting the increased US interest in interethnic issues inside Iran, 
US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns and 
Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams met July 21 with 
US-based representatives of Iranian minority ethnic groups. The 
ways in which Iran’s different ethnic groups view Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ‘s nuclear policies was of particular interest 
to both officials, stated Rahim Shahbazi, the deputy chairman of the 
World Azerbaijanis Congress (WAC), and one of the participants in 
the meeting.  
 
Amid an overview of conditions for ethnic Azeris in Iran, Shahbazi 
said that he had expressed the concern to Burns and Abrams that 
weapons of mass destruction, once acquired, could be used against 
groups perceived as opposed to the Ahmadinejad administration. 
"Dictators tend to use their weapons of mass destruction against the 
internal opposition first," he stated. "That is what happened in Iraq, 
when Saddam [Hussein] used chemical weapons against the Shi’ah 
opposition."  
 
US officials have not yet provided an account of what was discussed 
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during the meeting.  
 
The Iranian government is keen to draw connections between Azeri 
activists and the US and Israel, members of Iran’s Azeri community 
say. An April 10 report in The New Yorker magazine by investigative 
journalist Seymour Hersh – which indicated that Washington has 
been working with ethnic Azeris in Iran to undermine the Islamic 
Republic -- reportedly raised a furor in Tehran.  
 
Representatives of the Azeri opposition both inside Iran and in exile, 
however, deny Tehran’s allegation of financial dealings involving 
ethnic Azeris and the United States or Israel.  
 
Mahmudali Chehreganli, a former professor at Tabriz University and 
the leader of The National Awakening Movement of Southern 
Azerbaijan (SANAM), who received political asylum in the United 
States in 2003, told EurasiaNet that the Azeri movement "gets zero 
investment from the outside." Chehreganli declined to speak about 
meetings he has reportedly had with officials in the State Department 
and Pentagon since 2003.  
 
Other Azeri activists echo Chehreganli’s denial of US or Israeli 
support. Said Naimi, head of the Azerbaijan Defense Committee 
based in Tabriz, told EurasiaNet that Azerbaijani human rights 
activists and non-governmental organizations are the only places 
where his group seeks outside support.  
 
In an apparent effort to appease local Azeri grievances, President 
Ahmadinejad toured ethnic Azeri cities in July, promising to allocate 
state funds for various road and factory projects. At a demonstration 
in Tabriz, Ahmadinejad quoted from Azeri-language poems and 
praised the region of Azerbaijan as a pearl of Iran.  
 
One Azeri journalist based in Iran, Said Mughanli, reported that state 
employees and villagers were coerced into attending Ahmadinejad’s 
appearances. In addition, dozens of people were reportedly detained 
before Ahmadinejad’s appearances, and released afterwards, he said.  
 
According to Chehreganli, more resistance to Tehran can be 
expected. After the relatively moderate policies of former President 
Mohammad Khatami, patience is running thin with the more strident 
Ahmadinejad, he claimed.  
 
"The [Azeri] nation better understands its rights now. For the first 
time in the history of Tabriz, the city market was closed during the 
protest actions. For the first time in the history of this city, vendors 
left their business for a political protest," he said. "This, I think is a 
good indicator of the readiness of Azeris to take serious steps to 
change their lives for the better." 
Kurdistan 
A variety of reports support Hersh’s claims with respect to the use of 
Special Ops in Kurdistan. Unrest in Iranian Kurdistan has turned into 
a low level conventional war with the use of artillery. In summer 
2005 included the following fighting.  
Two Iraqi Kurdish villagers were killed and three others wounded in 
a cross-border Iranian artillery and rocket attack on villages in the 
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autonomous northern region of Iraqi Kurdistan on Friday, border 
patrol sources said Saturday.  
The sources told dpa that on Friday the town of Qandil, near the 
Iran-Iraq border, was the target of Iranian artillery fire for the third 
consecutive day.  
The sources added that Iraq's Kurdish villages of Kotsoi and Kani 
Shinka were hit with Iranian Katyusha rockets on Friday morning.  
Iranian artillery later pounded the Kurdish villages of Sina Mokka, 
Qarnaqa, Sourdi, Kani Khatoun, and Kanya Rahsh, resulting in the 
deaths of two Kurds and the wounding of three others, the sources 
said.  
The sources also said that the Iranian artillery barrage also set fire 
to several plots of agricultural land and killed livestock in the 
villages.  
Iran has targeted several Kurdish villages near the Iraqi border, 
especially in the mountainous Qandil region, on the suspicion that 
anti-Iranian Kurdish fighters belonging to the Party for a Free Life in 
Kurdistan (PEJAK), have been conducting cross-border raids into 
Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan.  
Iran has been targeting PEJAK fighters and their bases in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, while the Turkish army has been targeting the fighters and 
bases of the anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) near the 
same region in Iraq.29 
According to Voice of America and wire services in 2006,  
Iraqi Kurdish officials say the Iranian military has shelled an area 
inside northern Iraq during fighting between Iranian forces and 
Kurdish rebels. 
Spokesman for Iraqi Kurdistan security forces Jabbar Yawer 
confirmed Thursday's artillery attack in the Peshdar region. 
In recent months, Iran's Revolutionary Guard forces have clashed 
with Kurdish insurgents in northwestern Iran.  The rebels are 
believed to be linked to Turkey's separatist Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK), which is the target of a large-scale operation in southeast 
Turkey. 
The government of Iraq's Kurdish region has come under pressure 
from Turkey and the United States to deal with Turkish Kurd 
guerillas who launch attacks into Turkey from bases in northern Iraq. 
The PKK has been fighting for autonomy in Turkey's mainly Kurdish 
southeast since 1984.  The violence has killed more than 30,000 
people. 
The U.S., Turkey and the European Union classify the PKK as a 
terrorist group. 
In Baluchistan in South East Iran, the murder of 21 officials was 
blamed by the government on Britain in a Guardian report. 
Khuzestan  
Iranian oil production was halted by bombings, terrorist attack, 
according to reports from 2005.30 There is continuing state repression 
and non-state violence including bombings in the oil-rich Khuzestan 
or to use an older name - Arabistan. Iranian repression in Khuzestan 
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is said by some local Ahwazis to amount to ethnic cleansing. Iran has 
specifically charged Britain with carrying out bomb attacks in this 
ethnically diverse and oil rich region of Khuzestan. A 2005 report 
stated that, ‘The blasts, which injured 86 people, are the third series 
of bombings to hit Iran's southwest province of Khuzestan, the 
country's largest oil producing region, since June.’  
 
Iran accused U.K. agents of involvement in two bomb blasts that 
killed four people in the country's main oil region yesterday, just 10 
days after Britain blamed the Islamic republic for stirring up attacks 
against its troops in Iraq.  
 
The blasts, which injured 86 people, are the third series of bombings 
to hit Iran's southwest province of Khuzestan, the country's largest oil 
producing region, since June. The British Embassy in Iran rejected 
the Iranian accusations. No group has so far claimed responsibility 
for yesterday's bombs.  
 
"Most probably those involved in the explosion were British agents 
who were involved in the previous incidents in Ahvaz and 
Khuzestan,'' Deputy Interior Minister Mohammad Hossein 
Mousapour told state-run Mehr news agency today.  
 
Diplomatic tension between Tehran and London has been mounting 
since U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair said Oct. 6 there is evidence 
tying Iran to bombings in neighboring Iraq in the first public 
accusation that the Shiite Muslim country is supporting militants in 
Iraq. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is meeting Blair in 
London today to discuss Iran's nuclear program and find ways to 
prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.  
 
"There has been speculation in the past about alleged British 
involvement in Khuzestan. We reject these allegations,'' the British 
Embassy in Iran said today in a statement. "Any linkage between the 
British Government and these terrorist outrages is completely without 
foundation.''  
 
Ethnic Unrest  
 
The embassy expressed its "revulsion at and condemnation of the 
terrorist attacks,'' said the statement, which was posted on the 
Embassy's Web site.  
 
Hours after Iran accused the U.K. of involvement in the bombings, 
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stepped up pressure on Iran 
over its involvement in Iraq. The U.K. has evidence that "clearly 
links'' Iran with improvised explosive devices used in southern Iraq 
against British troops, Agence France Presse reported, citing 
comments made by Straw to reporters in London. Iran has rejected 
the British accusations. Iran holds the world's second-largest oil 
reserves and is the second-largest producer in the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries.  
 
Khuzestan has witnessed unrest in recent months that the government 
attributes to ethnic Arab separatists. Iran's ethnic Arabs, the majority 
in Ahvaz, make up 3 percent of the country's population. In early 
September, a series of bomb blasts in Khuzestan halted crude 
transfers from onshore wells. In June, one week before the country's 
presidential election, six people died after a series of explosions in 
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Ahvaz. At least another five died in ethnic clashes in April amid riots 
sparked by alleged plans to change the area's ethnic makeup.  
Bomb blasts in Ahwaz City, Iran31  
Ahwaz City witnessed multiple bomb attacks this morning, just 
two months after the Iranian government launched a bloody 
crack-down on Ahwazi Arab protestors in Iran's Khuzestan province. 
 
At least eight people were killed and dozens injured after massive 
bombs exploded in carefully targetted areas of Ahvaz City, 
Khuzestan's provincial capital: opposite the governor general's 
office, in front of the province's housing and urban development 
department and outside the house of the provincial chief of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). 
 
The attacks were co-ordinated to go off at around 6.00am GMT. No 
group has claimed responsibility. Ali Aqamohammadi, the official 
spokesman for Iran's Spreme Council on National Security and 
Khuzestan's Governor, blamed the attacks on the separatist Ahwazi 
Arab Peoples Democratic Popular Front (ADPF). The ADPF, which 
claimed it was involved in the April demonstrations, denies any 
involvement. Its London-based spokesman Mahmoud Ahmad told Al-
Jazeera TV: "We have no idea who has done this." The group is not 
known to be heavily armed and has not previously used explosives. 
 
The armed opposition group Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), also known 
as the MKO and the People's Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI), has also 
denied responsibility for the attacks, which were followed by a bomb 
blast in Tehran. Most of the MEK's combatants are being held in US 
custody at Camp Ashraf, the group's former headquarters in Iraq. 
The government's Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) has put the 
blame on the Brigades of Revolutionary Martyrs of Al-Ahwaz, an 
unknown "terrorist" group. There are suspicions that the bombs were 
planted by hard-liners within the regime itself to stir up religious 
extremism within the population and influence the results of the 
election. 
 
The April riots were sparked by the publication of a letter written by 
the then Vice-President Ali Abtahi which outlined plans to reduce the 
number of Arabs in Khuzestan from three-quarters to around a third 
of the total population, while eliminating Arab cultural heritage and 
placenames in the province. The letter can be downloaded here. 
 
Before the bomb attacks, local Ahwazi Arab leaders urged the 
government to give Khuzestan's largest ethnic group a fair share of 
the province's oil wealth and the right to political representation. In 
May, Jasem Shadidzadeh Al-Tamimi, a former member of parliament 
and the Secretary General of the Islamic Wefagh Party, a legal group 
representing Iranian Arabs, wrote an open letter to President 
Khatami. He asked him to "do your utmost in lowering the 'wall of 
mistrust' between the proud Iranian ethnicities, so that the 'infected 
wounds' of the Arab people of Ahwaz may heal." He stated that the 
government was denying Ahwazi Arabs peaceful, democratic means 
for protest. 
 
Nasser Ban-Assad, spokesman for the British Ahwazi Friendship 
Society (BAFS), said: "I would not be surprised if an element of the 
Ahwazi Arab population decided to use violent means, but the attacks 
are not going to help the situation in Khuzestan. We fear that today's 
wave of attacks will invite retaliation on the Arab population of 
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Khuzestan by the regime. Government forces have already killed 160 
Arab civilians over the past two months and hundreds more are being 
detained, including intellectuals and tribal leaders. There is evidence 
of torture and the arbitrary use of state violence on innocent 
civilians. 
 
"We are calling on Ahwazi Arabs to take up non-violent direct action 
against the regime and to boycott the forthcoming presidential 
elections. The call for civil disobedience is being broadcasted by the 
Al-Ahwaz TV station on the Assyrian satellite channel. We are also 
calling on Western governments, politicians and non-governmental 
organisations to highlight the plight of the Ahwazis and call for an 
end to their persecution and poverty." 
 
Without making any claim that they are engaged with the US or UK, 
it is worth noting several new political movements for regional 
autonomy. These include a new movement in Iranian Kurdistan and 
the National Council of Resistance of Iran. In addition the 
Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) supported by pro-regime change groups 
in Washington such as the Iran Policy Committee as being the one 
group with the ability to challenge the regime in Tehran despite or 
perhaps because of its reputation as fanatical and brutal in equal 
measure.  
In February 2005 groups from around Iran came together to found the 
Congress  of Iranian Nationalities for a Federal Iran. Later in the year 
the Neo-Conservative hub, the American Enterprise Institute 
presented the case for Federal Iran in October 2005. AEI - Events led 
by Michael Ledeen a strong supporter of regime change in Tehran 
and confidant of Karl Rove, a close advisor to the US President. 
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Strategic Command: Global Strike with nuclear 
weapons  
Summary 
There are persistent reports that the Administration is planning for the 
use of nuclear weapons as part of war planning for an attack on Iran. 
In early 2007, the UK Sunday Times reported that the Israeli air force 
is preparing for strikes on Iran, possibly nuclear.  
US National Security Strategies, nuclear use doctrines and war plans, 
all allow commanders to ask the President for authority to use nuclear 
weapons. This is the case even if neither the US or its allies have been 
attacked by nuclear or other WMD. In 1991, then Defence Secretary 
Dick Cheney forced then General Colin Powell to prepare nuclear 
strike plans against Iran. Current US policy and staff instruction 
manuals allow for the use of nuclear weapons to achieve objectives 
during a military mission if conventional forces cannot achieve the 
desired ends, and if the ends are integral to national security. We 
detail a number of possible nuclear use scenarios that accord with US 
security strategy, and with military doctrine.  
Planning for nuclear war 
Under US strategic warfare planning, STRATCOM, the command 
responsible for Global Strike, has integrated nuclear and conventional 
weapons in its war planning. Hans Kristensen has described this 
process:  
The most prominent example of this is Global Strike, a new 
mission assigned to Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in 
January 2003 in Change 2 to the Unified Command Plan. The 
directive identifies Global Strike as "a capability to deliver 
rapid, extended range, precision kinetic (nuclear and 
conventional) and non-kinetic (elements of space and 
information operations) effects in support of theater and national 
objectives."7 
Also known as CONPLAN (Contingency Plan) 8022, Global 
Strike envisions using nuclear (and conventional) forces to 
strike, preemptively if necessary, targets anywhere on the globe 
in a crisis. CONPLAN 8022 complements other nuclear strike 
plans (OPLAN 8044, formerly SIOP) and regional plans, but is 
distinct from them by its focus on prompt responses to crises and 
destruction of time-urgent targets that are not covered in the 
other deliberate plans. 
CONPLAN 8022 is focused on strikes against "rogue" states 
(e.g., North Korea, Iran, and Syria) and nonstate actors. The 
belief of the Bush administration that the threat from these 
adversaries is imminent prompted Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld in spring of 2004 to issue an "Alert Order" that 
directed the Pentagon to activate CONPLAN 8022. In response, 
the Air Force and Navy drew up strike sorties 
and attack profiles for their operational nuclear forces to be 
ready to strike on short notice if ordered to do so by the 
president. "Global Strike operations will normally be executed 
within compressed timelines (from seconds to days)... from the 
continental United States and forward bases," according to the 
JCS Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept (JIC)32 
Both the Washington Post and Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker 
speculated about the possible use of nuclear weapons against targets 
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in Natanz and Isfahan. As did Philip Giraldi in the American 
Conservative:  
The Pentagon, acting under instructions from Vice President 
Dick Cheney's office, has tasked the United States Strategic 
Command (STRATCOM) with drawing up a contingency plan to 
be employed in response to another 9/11-type terrorist attack on 
the United States.  The plan includes a large-scale air assault on 
Iran employing both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons.  
Within Iran there are more than 450 major strategic targets, 
including numerous suspected nuclear-weapons-program 
development sites.  Many of the targets are hardened or are deep 
underground and could not be taken out by conventional 
weapons, hence the nuclear option.  As in the case of Iraq, the 
response is not conditional on Iran actually being involved in the 
act of terrorism directed against the United States.  Several 
senior Air Force officers involved in the planning are reportedly 
appalled at the implications of what they are doing--that Iran is 
being set up for an unprovoked nuclear attack--but no one is 
prepared to damage his career by posing any objections.33 
An attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would come under the policy 
and military doctrine of counterproliferation. First launched under the 
Clinton administration in 2003, counterproliferation was a primarily 
military policy intended to support diplomatic and political non-
proliferation efforts. The Bush Administration has expanded the 
importance of counterproliferation, as their primary vehicle for 
preventing or rolling back the spread of nuclear weapons to 
America’s enemies.34 This doctrine assumes that proliferation is 
inevitable, and that military means are needed to prevent what 
President Bush has called "the world’s most dangerous people" from 
obtaining "the world’s most dangerous weapons". From the 2002 
Nuclear Posture Review, through the National Security Strategies of 
2002 and 2006, via the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) and the Joint Doctrine to Combat WMD, 
the administration has consistently stressed military solutions over 
diplomatic solutions for fighting the spread of nuclear weapons. At all 
times the administration has left open the door for the use of nuclear 
weapons to prevent other countries, like Iran, from building their own 
nuclear weapons. 
Would the administration ever sanction the use of nuclear weapons in 
an attack on Iran? Many observers believe that this option is unlikely, 
and yet the administration has prepared policy that allows for the use 
of nuclear weapons for exactly this kind of mission.  
Indeed, after the 1991 Gulf War, Colin Powell recounted how he was 
ordered by then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to prepare plans 
to use nuclear weapons against the Iraqi army. He did so, but he and 
General Butler, then head of Strategic Command, later burned the 
plans to prevent their use. Butler confirmed Powell’s account in 
conversation with the author. Numerous nuclear weapons were 
required to attack Iraq’s Army and both Powell and Butler were so 
opposed to the idea that they had to be given direct orders by Cheney.  
Nevertheless, neither resigned their posts and both men prepared the 
plans. 
In the case of Iran, experts close to the US military have told the 
authors that the Pentagon was ordered to draw up attack plans that 
would give 80% confidence that Iran’s nuclear facilities were 
destroyed after 5 days of strikes. For the facilities at Natanz (and 
maybe the tunnel complex at Isfahan were uranium enrichment 
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feedstock is stored), it is thought likely that that this level of 
confidence could only be achieved with the use of nuclear weapons or 
by occupying the sites with special forces troops. It is therefore 
relevant to explore the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. 
Strict guidelines on the situations the military consider to warrant the 
use of nuclear weapons are outlined in the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 
Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations.  According to this 
doctrine, employment suitability is determined by the following: 
• Relative Effectiveness 
• Nuclear Collateral Damage 
• Enemy Responses 
• Advance Planning 
• Execution Planning to Deconflict  [reduce] Friendly 
Casualties 
• Other Considerations 
In military doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons is warranted only if 
they offer a clear and substantial advantage over the use of 
conventional weapons.  Advanced planning in such a situation is 
critical, as the decision to use nuclear weapons is one with significant 
repercussions.  The effectiveness of nuclear weapons must be such 
that they are the only option for striking a particular target. 
Commanders and their staff must consider deploying nuclear 
weapons in such a fashion as to minimize civilian casualties and must 
take into consideration the responses of enemy forces related to such 
an attack. Could this apply to targets in Iran? The policy and military 
doctrine of the United States are quite clear.  The National Strategy 
To Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD), the paper 
which sets military doctrine that would govern the strikes on Iran, 
sets the tone from its opening paragraphs: 
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of 
radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared 
that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence 
indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United 
States will not allow these efforts to succeed. …History will 
judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to 
act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace 
and security is the path of action.35 
This paragraph could have been tailor-written for Iran. Ironically, 
since the National Strategy to Combat WMD is critical of some states 
for the willingness to use nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction, and the administration is strongly critical of Iran’s 
nuclear program, US strategy and doctrine also countenances the use 
of nuclear weapons by the United States for counterproliferation 
missions, stating that: 
We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in 
preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile 
states and terrorists. Therefore, U.S. military and appropriate 
civilian agencies must possess the full range of operational 
capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by states and 
terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and 
friends and allies.36 
Clearly, applied to the current situation, this means that the United 
States would be prepared to use nuclear weapons against Iran if 
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conventional forces are not adequate to the task of preventing Iran 
gaining a nuclear capacity. Pentagon nuclear use doctrine says that:  
Enemy combat forces and facilities that may be likely targets for 
nuclear strikes include WMD and their delivery systems; 
ground combat units, air defense facilities, naval installations, 
combat vessels, nonstate actors, and underground facilities. 
(Original emphasis)37 
“[U]nderground facilities” is a category that could include the 
uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, as well as the tunnel complex at 
Isfahan. Military commanders are not constrained to wait to be 
attacked with NBC weapons before retaliating. Rather, they are told 
that active as well as passive defense measures should be taken 
against this possibility and: 
Operations must be planned and executed to destroy or 
eliminate enemy WMD delivery systems and supporting 
infrastructure before they can strike friendly forces. (Emphasis 
added) 38 
Such a strike could be with conventional weapons if the commander 
in theater had full confidence that the facility to be destroyed was 
vulnerable to conventional attack. However, as the above quote from 
the Joint Chiefs’ Doctrine on Theater Nuclear Operations shows, the 
United States is prepared for a nuclear first strike in theater warfare. 
Grounds on which nuclear weapons can be sued are elaborated in US 
nuclear use doctrine. The latest version of this doctrine, in JP 3-12 
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations dates from 2005.  
(1) Geographic combatant commanders may request 
Presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons for a variety of 
conditions. Examples include: 
(e) For rapid and favorable war termination on US terms. 
(f) To ensure success of US and multinational operations. 
(g) To demonstrate US intent and capability to use nuclear 
weapons to deter adversary use of WMD. 
(h) To respond to adversary-supplied WMD use by 
surrogates against US and multinational forces or civilian 
populations. 
(2) Use of nuclear weapons within a theater requires that 
nuclear and conventional plans be integrated to the greatest 
extent possible and that careful consideration be given to the 
potential impact of nuclear effects on friendly forces.39 
These conditions can clearly be applied to the case of Iran. The war 
plans dealing with Iran that exist and are described elsewhere in this 
paper are therefore likely to contain elements for the use of 
conventional and nuclear forces: 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with 
CDRUSSTRATCOM, and appropriate supporting combatant 
commanders, initiates crisis action planning procedures 
contained in CJCSI 3110.04B, Nuclear Supplement to Joint 
Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY05 (U), and the appropriate 
CDRUSSTRATCOM support plans. Geographic combatant 
commander OPLANs and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Emergency Action Procedures provide additional guidance. 
Nuclear operations planning is integrated into theater plans to 
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ensure conventional campaign plans are complemented by 
nuclear weapons employment. (Emphasis added)40 
The general officer leading the attack will work with the Commander 
of CENTCOM to request nuclear weapons for use on selected targets 
that meet certain criteria, as described in the doctrine paper: 
The geographic combatant commander continually monitors 
theater events and recommends (nominates) targets supporting 
theater strategy, based on military objectives that support the 
national security strategy.41 
In the case of Iran, doubts over the vulnerability of Natanz and 
Isfahan to conventional attack could lead to their being selected as 
potential nuclear targets. Indeed Seymour Hersh reported in 2006 that 
“One of the military’s initial option plans, as presented to the White 
House by the Pentagon this winter, calls for the use of a bunker-
buster tactical nuclear weapon, such as the B61-11, against 
underground nuclear sites.”42 At the same time, Bill Arkin, with 20 
years experience looking at pentagon war planning, reported that 
“Bush directed the U.S. Strategic Command to draw up a global 
strike war plan for an attack against Iranian weapons of mass 
destruction. All of this will ultimately feed into a new war plan for 
"major combat operations" against Iran that military sources confirm 
now exists in draft form.”43 It is probable that every effort would first 
be made to ensure all WMD target’s destruction with conventional 
bombs, and with thermobaric weapons. However, the possibility 
remains that these two facilities could be the subject of nuclear attack. 
There is also a risk that wider nuclear strikes could be considered, if 
the combatant commander felt that they were necessary to achieve the 
mission objectives. 
A nuclear strike on Iran 
Any nuclear attack on Iran is unlikely and hard to conceive, still less 
the use of nuclear weapons by the nations in what the British call the 
“special relationship”.  Nevertheless were the US to use nuclear 
weapons it might well seek UK participation for the same reasons it 
does on other occasions. And in British strategic policy approved by 
Parliament is a similar rational for using nuclear weapons even when 
Britain itself is not under attack that we have discussed in the US 
context. 
After 9/11 the British government added a ‘New Chapter’ to the 
Strategic Defence Review extended the role of nuclear weapons 
further to include “states of concern” and “terrorist organisations”:  
 
The UK's nuclear weapons have a continuing use as a means of 
deterring major strategic military threats, and they have a 
continuing role in guaranteeing the ultimate security of the UK. 
But we also want it to be clear, particularly to the leaders of 
states of concern and terrorist organisations, that all our forces 
play a part in deterrence, and that we have a broad range of 
responses available.44 
 
The sub-strategic Trident, and the commitment to use it to threaten 
terrorists and so-called rogue states, places UK policy in step with US 
policy. Rogers recalls a conversation in the mid 1990s with what he 
described as “a serving British Admiral” in which the admiral cited as 
an example (of the use of sub-strategic Trident) a future confrontation 
with a nuclear-armed state in the Middle East, believing it to be 
eminently practicable to use a Trident missile with a single warhead 
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to fire a low-yield demonstration shot or, if necessary, use a 
combination of missiles and warheads in a pre-emptive strike against 
opponent’s nuclear facilities. 
 
Unfortunately, it is also necessary to consider that the UK and US 
governments have recently given active consideration to using 
nuclear weapons at the time of the attack on Iraq. A few weeks before 
the war started, Geoff Hoon, the British Defence Secretary told the 
BBC that “we have always made it clear that we would reserve the 
right to use nuclear weapons in conditions of extreme self-defence. 
Saddam can be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we 
would be willing to use nuclear weapons”.45 
 
William Arkin, wrote about US nuclear war planning for Iraq in 
January of 2003 that “at the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 
in Omaha and inside planning cells of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, target 
lists are being scrutinized, options are being pondered and procedures 
are being tested to give nuclear armaments a role in the new US 
doctrine of "pre-emption." According to multiple sources close to the 
process, the current planning focuses on two possible roles for 
nuclear weapons: attacking Iraqi facilities located so deep 
underground that they might be impervious to conventional 
explosives and thwarting Iraq's use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
The current nuclear planning, revealed in interviews with military 
officers and described in documents reviewed by the Los Angeles 
Times, is being carried out at STRATCOM's Omaha headquarters, 
among small teams in Washington and at Vice President Dick 
Cheney's "undisclosed location" in Pennsylvania.” 46 
 
At the present time, Western concern over nuclear proliferation is 
focused on Iran. Former British Defense Secretary, Geoff Hoon, 
explained that he could see the possibility of a nuclear war with Iran 
around 2020. 
 
The Mail on Sunday47 reported that the then Defense Secretary said 
“…when our friends in Iran have perfected an intercontinental, 
ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead, we'll have a vote. See how 
many people say I've got to press the button to stop the missiles 
coming in. I think I might win that one."  
 
The following scenario of an American-British nuclear strike on Iran 
is intended as an illustration of what might be involved and is not 
intended to indicate that such an event is likely. A future nuclear war 
might involve other states entirely or, we hope, never happen at all.  
The case study scenario made for this analysis estimates that more 
than two million people would be killed in a short time by an attack 
on eleven of Iran’s suspected WMD facilities using weapons smaller 
than the Hiroshima bomb. The scenario applies Anglo-American 
policy and Pentagon software on the use of nuclear weapons to a 
practical case where similar plans almost certainly exist in secret. 
British Conservative support for such an option to remain on the table 
requires, in itself, an examination of what might be involved. 
The study had the assistance of associates of the Harvard Medical 
School to use computer software used by the US Government 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency to calculate the effects on the 
population of Iran of these attacks and possible nuclear fallout 
resulting from the explosions. These results are calculated with an 
exactitude that is only designed to illustrate what might happen rather 
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than to predict what will happen. Actual events would occur more or 
less severely depending on circumstances. For example, it is 
impossible to calculate the weather exactly, so the fallout born by the 
wind cannot itself be modeled exactly. Nevertheless, these models are 
the best available public information and are used by the US 
government. 
Attacks on sites in the mountains are estimated to kill thousands, 
those in the cities; millions. Such are the considerations of planning 
nuclear war. 
In the case of Iran, many public sources of information such as the 
Federation of American Scientists and the Monterrey Institute for 
International Studies list dozens of locations where Iran is supposed 
to have bases and facilities for nuclear, chemical, biological and 
missile research and development as well as many more military 
missiles sites, not to mention military Headquarters. 
Consequently the target list of eleven locations in Iran selected for 
this report represents a rather limited list. This report assumes that 
each site is attacked with three weapons- in reality the consideration 
of redundancy of overlapping or cross targeting of weapons could 
well produce a logic of several more weapons per target.48 
The scenario in this report assumes that all of the weapons are 10 
kilotons, ten thousand tons of TNT. This is 1/10th of the size of the 
standard Trident W-76 warhead and smaller than the Hiroshima 
bomb. As nuclear weapons go a 10 kiloton weapon is very small. The 
Natural Resources Defense Council details the explosive power of the 
nuclear weapons in the US arsenal49 
Of the 33 nuclear weapons in this study’s scenario, it is assumed that 
3 are British Trident sub-strategic warheads on the basis that the UK 
would contribute some 10% of a US/UK strike force. 
It is possible to argue that this scenario is unrealistic, and that too 
many targets have been attacked, or indeed too few. That the weapons 
used are too many or too few and too large or too small; that more 
British weapons would be used or less. These are important 
arguments to have. 
It is possible to argue that the mere discussion of options itself is a 
deterrent or an incitement to other countries to get nuclear weapons 
before they are attacked.  
It is not responsible to argue that they will never be used and that 
there is no need for public debate. The weapons exist. The military 
personnel trained in their use exist. The political policy describing 
their possible use exists. What is lacking is a public discussion 
amongst those who support present policies of the realities of putting 
these policies into practice.  
Conclusion 
All too often, supporters of present nuclear weapons and policies 
argue two contradictory positions. First they argue that the whole 
panoply of weapons and policy is essential and then they deny as 
outrageous any suggestion that they might be used. If it is indeed the 
case that the weapons cannot be used in the manner for which 
military personnel are trained to use them, then the supporters of 
these policies have sacrificed the proven and effective strategy of 
arms control and deterrence for a dangerous bluff.  
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The point of producing a nuclear war scenario for this report is to try 
to glimpse the reality that would be entailed if Anglo-American 
policy on using nuclear weapons for fighting were put into action.  
The data produced using the US Department of Defense software of 
the results of this attack on Iran indicate that over two million people 
would be killed in a short time, at least as many severely injured and 
that radioactive fallout would affect large areas of Iran. 50  
Attacks on some Iranian facilities far from centres of population 
would kill two or three thousand people in the short-term; other 
attacks on facilities in cities immediately kill hundreds of thousands. 
It is also certain that radiation from these explosions would reach the 
upper atmosphere and be carried across much of the earth. In the 
early 1960s public concern over detected concentrations of 
radioactivity in cows milk produced the public pressure that led to a 
US, UK, Russian ban on explosive testing in the atmosphere. In 1986 
after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor radiation reached 
large parts of Europe.  
Hypothetical targets in Iran and prompt deaths using US DoD 
methodology for attacks of 3x10kt ground burst weapon per 
location 
NB These targets are less than half of the Suspected WMD facilities 
discussed in the open literature and do not include any Iranian 
conventional military forces, national command centres or industrial 
sites.  
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Location Estimated 
prompt 
deaths 
Type of facility    Sources 
- www.fas.org; 
www.globalsecurity.org 
www.miis.edu 
Human habitation 
Bonab 2,000 Atomic Energy Research 
Centre 
Nearby city 
Bushehr 6,000 Nuclear Reactor under 
construction 
Nearby port-city 
Chalus 69,000 Possible underground 
nuclear weapons 
development facility 
North lies the coastal 
town of Chalus 
Damghan 70,000 Possible biological and 
chemical facility 
Ancient Islamic city. 
Centre of pistachio 
production 
Darkhovin 2,000 Suspected underground 
nuclear weapons facility 
Abadan and Basra are 
in the vicinity 
Esfahann 572,000 The primary location of 
the Iranian nuclear 
program; missile assembly 
and production plant; 
chemical weapons 
production. 
Industrial and 
University city 
Lavizan 331,000 Missiles City 
Parchin 15,000 Suspected Chemical 
weapons. Defence 
industries base  
30 miles SW of 
Tehran 
Qazvin 255,000 
 
Suspected chemical 
weapons facilities 
“Silk Road” city 
W of Tehran 
Tabriz 899,000 Reported chemical 
weapons and missile 
facilities 
City 
Tehran 597,000 Nuclear Research Centre City 
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Surface fallout 48 hrs after a nuclear attack on Iran 
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 Attacks of these types may still seem far-fetched, so it is worth 
concluding the discussion of Firing Trident with this extract from the 
US Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Doctrine for Theatre Nuclear 
Operations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Extract from a Pentagon manual on planning nuclear 
war  
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Effects of nuclear strike on Natanz 
It may well be that, to fulfil mission requirements, it would only be 
necessary to use nuclear weapons against Natanz, or at most Natanz 
and Isfahan. These limited nuclear strike options would still have 
important consequences for Iran and the wider region. 
If the use of a very low yield nuclear weapon or weapons proves 
inadequate to destroy a target such as Natanz, then the President may 
decide to order the use of a larger bomb were he to determine that the 
destruction of the target is essential to success of the mission. The 
likely bomb would be the only nuclear earth-penetrating weapon in 
the arsenal, the B61-11. It is believed that the nuclear yield of this 
variant of the B61 is on the order of 400kt. In the scenario shown 
below, a single 400kt nuclear bomb is detonated on the surface at 
Natanz. The ensuing radioactive fallout would kill on the order of 
10,000 people, with 40,000 receiving a dose of radiation that would 
mean they needed decontamination and almost 750,000 living in the 
area which would be affected by fallout.  
 
A second possible scenario for the nuclear destruction of Natanz 
assumes the use of three 3 kiloton bombs on the underground 
uranium enrichment hall at Natanz (three bombs are assumed to allow 
for assured destruction). A tactical nuclear attack on Natanz by Israel, 
as described by the Sunday Times would likely have little effect on 
the civilian population. Modelling using Defense Department Hazard 
Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) software, shows that 
casualties would be few, even from radioactive fallout if the weapons 
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used were in the 1-3 kiloton range. However, as warhead yield 
increased, the threat to nearby civilian populations, and eventually to 
the city of Isfahan itself would grow.  Even with low yield warheads, 
a substantial population would be exposed to nuclear fallout. (This is 
discussed further below). 
This option is least unlikely for an attack by Israel, which lacks the 
capacity to carry out a broader range of attacks. This action carries 
the same political and military risks of Iranian retaliation as larger 
attack scenarios, but the operation would do the least to disrupt or 
delay the Iranian program.51 
 
The Bush administration would have to make some very difficult 
calculations in deciding whether or not to use nuclear weapons 
against Iran, especially in the absence of an immediate threat of use 
of WMD by Iran against US targets or Israel. The widespread use of 
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nuclear weapons is likely to bring such opprobrium that only a truly 
significant threat of destruction of an Israeli city or a threat of similar 
magnitude could possibly be used to justify it. However, there are 
undoubtedly those inside the administration who would argue that 
limited nuclear use for the destruction of Natanz would be much more 
feasible as destruction would be limited to the target area, there 
would be few civilian casualties, and the fear of fallout would do 
much to disrupt Iran in the attack’s aftermath. 
 
How likely is an Attack? The US Political 
Context 
 
The administration has steadfastly refused to remove the military 
option from the table, and has continued to prepare to go to war. 
Congress rejected a proposal to require the President to consult it 
before going to war with Iran.  
 
Given the Iranian need for security guarantees of safety from the 
United States as part of a solution to both this crisis, and the overall 
state of US-Iranian relations, the refusal to recognise Iran or to take 
war off the table removes a key part of the bargain necessary to 
defuse the situation. That, however, is administration policy, as 
repeatedly and consistently restated by administration spokespeople: 
 
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice 
 
January 30, 2007: “Going to the [UN] Security Council is not the end 
of diplomacy [with Iran]. It is just diplomacy in a different, more 
robust context. But, the president of the United States doesn't take his 
options off the table and, frankly, I don't think people should want the 
president of the United States to take his options off the table,” 
 
May 8, 2007: "The American president will not abandon the military 
option and I believe that we do not want him to do so," Rice said in 
an interview with Al Arabiya television, part of which was broadcast 
on Tuesday.52 
 
July 6, 2007: “Well, the president's never going to take his options off 
the table and frankly no one should want the American president to 
take his options off the table.”53 
 
Vice President Dick Cheney 
 
February 25, 2007: “all options are still on the table”54 
 
Some supporters of President Bush have taken a harder line, for 
example former UN Ambassador John Bolton told an audience of 
MPs in the House of Commons that: “They must know everything is 
on the table and they must understand what that means. We can hit 
different points along the line. You only have to take out one part of 
their nuclear operation to take the whole thing down.”55 Bolton has 
taken on the public role of spokesman for the “neo-con” wing of the 
administration’s supporters since he left office after failing to be 
confirmed by the US Senate. In amore recent speech he elaborated on 
his thinking: 
 
“The current approach of the Europeans and the Americans is 
not just doomed to failure, but dangerous,” he said. “Dealing 
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with [the Iranians] just gives them what they want, which is 
more time…  “We have fiddled away four years, in which 
Europe tried to persuade Iran to give up voluntarily,” he 
complained. “Iran in those four years mastered uranium 
conversion from solid to gas and now enrichment to weapons 
grade… We lost four years to feckless European diplomacy and 
our options are very limited.”  Bolton said flatly that “diplomacy 
and sanctions have failed… [So] we have to look at: 1, 
overthrowing the regime and getting in a new one that won’t 
pursue nuclear weapons; 2, a last-resort use of force.” 
 However, he added a caution as to the viability of the first of 
those remaining options: While “the regime is more susceptible 
to overthrow from within than people think,” he said, such a 
process “may take more time than we have.”56 
 
Other neo-conservative allies of the administration led by the 
influential pressure group, the American Enterprise Institute, have 
developed a strategy for regime change in Iran that does not involve a 
ground invasion. As with Iraq, weapons of mass destruction will 
provide the rationale for military action, though it won't be limited to 
attacks on a few weapons factories and the wider goal of 
overthrowing the regime is more important.57  
 
This harder line from some administration supporters reflects a debate 
that is going on inside the White House, as reported in the New York 
Times. It is said that Vice President Cheney believes that the spring 
of 2008 will be the timeframe for a decision on whether or not to 
attack Iran, while Secretary of State Rice has come to believe that 
diplomacy is the only route to prevent Iranian acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. Other observers have put it more starkly, for example, the 
Steve Clemons Washington Note blog (highly regarded by political 
observers in Washington DC) says that Cheney is engaged in a 
strategy of ‘insubordination’ on Iran, to tie the President’s hands as 
the President ‘cannot be trusted’ on the issue. This is also reflected in 
ongoing struggles between Cheney and Rice that has been reported in 
the American media; 
 
And Michael Hirsh and Mark Hosenball write in Newsweek: 
"A Newsweek investigation shows that Cheney's national-
security team has been actively challenging Rice's Iran strategy 
in recent months. 'We hear a completely different story coming 
out of Cheney's office, even now, than what we hear from Rice 
on Iran,' says a Western diplomat whose embassy has close 
dealings with the White House. Officials from the veep's office 
have been openly dismissive of the nuclear negotiations in think-
tank meetings with Middle East analysts in Washington, 
according to a high-level administration official who asked for 
anonymity because of his position. Since Tehran has defied two 
U.N. resolutions calling for a suspension of its uranium-
enrichment program, 'there's a certain amount of schadenfreude 
among the hard-liners,' says a European diplomat who's 
involved in the talks but would not comment for the record. And 
Newsweek has learned that the veep's team seems eager to build 
a case that Iran is targeting Americans not just in Iraq but along 
the border of its other neighbor, Afghanistan. 
"In the last few weeks, Cheney's staff have unexpectedly become 
more active participants in an interagency group that steers 
policy on Afghanistan, according to an official familiar with the 
internal deliberations. During weekly meetings of the committee, 
known as the Afghanistan Interagency Operating Group, Cheney 
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staffers have been intensely interested in a single issue: recent 
intelligence reports alleging that Iran is supplying weapons to 
Afghanistan's resurgent Islamist militia, the Taliban, according 
to two administration officials who asked for anonymity when 
discussing internal meetings. . . .58 
 
Republican Guard support for the indurgency in Iraq, notably the 
supply of sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) is 
linked to a potential US attrack on Iran. Time Magazine recently 
quoted an administration official as saying “An Administration 
official told me it's not even a consideration. “IRGC IED's are a casus 
belli for this Administration. There will be an attack on Iran.”59 
Iran as an Election Issue in the United States 
 
This debate is bleeding over into the 2008 Presidential election, with 
evidence mounting that despite the public unpopularity of the war in 
Iraq, Iran is emerging as an issue over which Presidential candidates 
in both major American parties can show their strong national 
security bona fides.  
 
Republican candidates for president in 2008 have spoken of the need 
to take military action to prevent Iranian acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. They even support the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, 
to enforce Iran’s non-nuclear weapons status. 
 
At the Republican debate last night, almost all the candidates 
said that they would not rule out a nuclear attack on Iran as a 
means to prevent it from getting its own nuclear weapons..."We 
have to come to our senses about this issue of war and pre-
emption," he said. The audience applauded, but he didn't get 
much support from his fellow candidates… Rep. Duncan Hunter 
of California was the starkest: "I would authorize the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons if there was no other way to preempt 
those particular centrifuges," he said. Former New York Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani said he believed that the job "could be done 
with conventional weapons," but he added that "you can't rule 
out anything and you shouldn't take any option off the table." 
Former Virginia Gov. Jim Gilmore also left "all options are on 
the table" with regard to Iranian nuclear weapons. Said former 
Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney: "I wouldn't take any options 
off the table." After the debate, former Sen. Fred Thompson of 
Tennessee, who did not particpate, added his name to the list of 
candidates who would consider a preemptive attack against 
Iran. Only Rep. Ron Paul of Texas, the "Dennis the Menace" of 
his party, said he opposed a nuclear strike on moral grounds and 
because he believed Iran "has done no harm to us directly and is 
no threat to our national security.60 
 
It must not be supposed that only republican candidates for the 
Presidency have taken a hard line on Iran, a quick survey of 
Democrat candidates shows similar opinions: 
 
To ensure Iran never gets nuclear weapons, we need to keep ALL 
options on the table. Let me reiterate – ALL options must 
remain on the table.” 
          - Former Senator John Edwards (D-NC) 
“…we should take no option, including military action, off the 
table.” 
          - Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) 
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“…as I’ve also said for a long time, no option can be taken off 
the table.” 
          - Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) 
Are Democrats simply being careless with their language or are 
they also willing to consider using nuclear weapons against 
Iran?61 
 
The debate on how to deal with Iran is thus occurring in a political 
context in the US that is hard for those in Europe or the Middle East 
to understand. A context that may seem to some to be divorced from 
reality, but with the US ability to project military power across the 
globe, the reality of Washington DC is one that matters perhaps 
above all else. 
 
The US has recently ratcheted up the rhetoric against Iran, recently 
accusing Tehran of complicity in killing Americans in Iraq. As the 
Guardian reported on July 3 “The US yesterday publicly accused Iran 
of intervening in the Iraq conflict, claiming that its Revolutionary 
Guard played a role in an attack that killed five Americans and was 
using Lebanese militants to train Iraqi insurgents. The allegations 
marked a significant escalation as previous similar claims have been 
made mostly off the record.” The claims coincide with increasingly 
heated rhetoric in Washington.  
Iran in Congress 
Last month, Joseph Lieberman, a former presidential candidate now 
an independent senator, called for air strikes on Iran in retaliation for 
its alleged role in Iraq. "I think we've got to be prepared to take 
aggressive military action against the Iranians to stop them from 
killing Americans in Iraq," the Connecticut senator said. "And to me, 
that would include a strike over the border into Iran, where we have 
good evidence that they have a base at which they are training these 
people coming back into Iraq to kill our soldiers."”62 
 
The Democrat-controlled Congress has also taken legislative action to 
increase pressure over Iran on President George W. Bush, passing a 
bill through a key House committee that would force the President to 
sanction oil and gas companies doing business with Iran.  
Other provisions in the legislation, building on existing law, would 
require that sanctioned companies at a minimum be barred from 
doing business with the U.S. government and affect subsidiaries and 
principal executive officers as well as parent firms. It would re-
impose a total ban on Iranian imports, reversing a "goodwill gesture" 
by former President Bill Clinton that allowed in carpets and certain 
other products. It would also prohibit the export of civil aviation 
equipment to Iran, which would make it hard for the administration to 
fulfil its commitment to incentives offered by the United States, 
Britain, France and Germany last year as an inducement to halt 
enrichment. The bill would also require the president to determine 
whether the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps should be designated 
a foreign terrorist organization. It also would eliminate some tax 
breaks for companies investing in Iran, decrease U.S. contributions to 
the World Bank if the bank invests in Iran and bar a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with Russia if Moscow continues to assist 
Tehran's nuclear program. 
This legislation would remove flexibility and discretion from the 
President’s power. He can currently exempt companies from the 
sanctions if he chooses. The legislation was drafted by Rep. Tom 
Lantos, chair of the House International Relations Committee, and is 
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supported by other prominent House Democrats including Rep. Gary 
Ackerman. The bill was approved 37 to 1 by the House of 
Representatives International Relations Committee. 
Lantos accused the Bush administration of "abusing its waiver 
authority" by never sanctioning any foreign oil company that has 
invested in Iran. "By now every single European leader fully 
understands, and acknowledges, that Iran is hell-bent on acquiring 
nuclear weapons," he added. "It is time for Europe to cease investing 
in Iran's energy industry, and our legislation will facilitate that 
result." Foreign investment in Iran equals money for terrorism and 
attacks on Americans," Democrat Gary Ackerman said. "Investment 
in Iran's petroleum sector enables that country to pursue nuclear 
weapons, to arm insurgents fighting American troops, and to 
underwrite Hezbollah and Hamas," he said.63 
Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR) and Senator Barrack Obama (D-IL) 
have both introduced similar legislation in the Senate. Senator 
Smith’s legislation has been introduced as an amendment to the 
Defense Authorization bill, and will be voted on as part of 
consideration as that bill. Senator Obama’s bill has been introduced 
as freestanding legislation, but this has yet to be considered by 
Committee. Introducing his legislation, Obama accused Tehran of 
using lucrative energy revenues "to build its nuclear program and to 
fund terrorist groups that export its militaristic and radical ideology to 
Iraq and throughout the Middle East." "Pressuring companies to cut 
their financial ties with Iran is critical to ensuring that sanctions have 
their intended result.”64 
Other US Aspects 
 
The regime in Tehran has already complained of US- and UK-
inspired terror attacks in several Iranian regions where the population 
opposes the ayatollahs' fanatical policies. Such reports corroborate 
the American journalist Seymour Hersh's claim that the US military is 
already engaged in a low-level war with Iran. The fighting is most 
intense in the Kurdish north where Iran has been firing artillery into 
Iraq. The US and Iran are already engaged in a low-level proxy war 
across the Iran-Iraq border that we detail above. And, once again, the 
neo-cons at the American Enterprise Institute have a plan for a 
peaceful settlement: this time it is for a federal Iran. Officially, 
Michael Ledeen, the AEI plan's sponsor, has been ostracised by the 
White House. However, two years ago, the Congress of Iranian 
Nationalities for a Federal Iran had its inaugural meeting in London. 
 
We should not underestimate the Bush administration's ability to 
convince itself that an "Iran of the regions" will emerge from a post-
rubble Iran. So, do not be in the least surprised if the United States 
attacks Iran. Timing is an open question, but it is hard to find 
convincing arguments that war will be avoided, or at least ones that 
are convincing in Washington.  
In the aftermath, the US will support regime change, hoping to 
replace the ayatollahs with an Iran of the regions. The US and British 
governments now support a coalition of groups seeking a federal Iran. 
This may be another neocon delusion, but that may not be the point. 
Making Tehran concentrate on internal problems leaves it unable to 
act elsewhere. 
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The Israeli Military and Political Dimension 
Israel has consistently taken a strong line on Iran’s nuclear weapons 
capabilities, stressing worse case scenarios, usually going well 
beyond conclusions that have been supported by the CIA or other 
American or western intelligence agencies. The most recent analysis 
from Israeli military intelligence estimates that Iran could have a 
bomb as soon as mid-2009, but more likely one or two years later. In 
contrast the CIA worst case is that Iran is three to six years from a 
possible nuclear capability. The Sunday Times reported in January 
2007 that raids were being planned by Israel on Arak, Natanz and 
Isfahan, and that these might include nuclear weapons.65 
 
Journalists briefed by Israeli military intelligence have written that: 
The Israeli analysts gave little chance of the Islamic regime in 
Tehran being toppled from within, noting that huge oil revenue 
enabled it to ensure domestic peace despite widespread 
dissatisfaction with the regime. International pressure and 
sanctions could delay Iran's program and oblige Tehran to 
compromise, the assessment said. Technological difficulties Iran 
is having with the atomic program could also slow it up. The 
last-resort option, a military strike, could significantly set back 
Iran's efforts despite the extensive safeguarding of nuclear 
facilities it has done, the assessment said. Israeli officials say the 
chances of a US strike at Iran's nuclear facilities are steadily 
diminishing. An Israeli strike remains on the table, although its 
likelihood is far from certain. Israeli military intelligence has set 
up a new department charged with translating intelligence into 
firm targets for such a strike. This is in addition to the efforts of 
the Israeli air force, which has its own department to process 
intelligence and identify targets.66  
This analysis, with its heavy emphasis on the need for military action 
against Iran within a window of opportunity that is quickly closing, 
fits with Israeli analyses over the past few years. Israel began an 
assertive campaign of action against the Iranian nuclear program very 
early after revelations of illicit nuclear in Iran first surfaced: 
 
Israel is working on a wide range of measures to undermine 
Iran's nuclear program, with senior leaders hinting that Israel 
may take preemptive action if that is deemed necessary. Analysts 
here suggest that action may include a strike similar to Israel's 
1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor. The Israeli initiative 
includes political, military, and intelligence wings of government 
and dovetails with US efforts to contain Iran within the 
framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
The effort reflects the widespread assessment here that Iran 
poses a greater threat than Iraq has for the past decade and is 
gaining nuclear expertise more quickly than the US estimates. 
 
The Center for Non-Proliferation Studies has written that: 
 
.. it appears that some in Israel are seriously considering a pre-
emptive attack similar to the June 1981 attack on Osirak that 
destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor. Meir Dagan, the Chief of 
Mossad, told parliament members in his inaugural appearance 
before the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense 
Committee that Iran was close to the "point of no return" and 
that the specter of Iranian possession of nuclear weapons was 
 56 
the greatest threat to Israel since its inception. On November 11, 
2003, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said that Israel 
had "no plans to attack nuclear facilities in Iran." Less than two 
weeks later however, during a visit to the United States, Israel's 
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that "under no 
circumstances would Israel be able to tolerate nuclear weapons 
in Iranian possession" and just six weeks earlier, Mossad had 
revealed plans for preemptive attacks by F-16 bombers on 
Iranian nuclear sites.67 
 
In a recent interview, President Clinton’s Middle East envoy, Dennis 
Ross, said that: 
 
They [Israel] take what (Iranian President Mahmoud) 
Ahmadinejad says very seriously, and only last (month) he said, 
"The countdown to the destruction of the Zionist regime is under 
way." Even (Former President Ali Akbar Hashemi) Rafsanjani, 
who is seen as more pragmatic, said several years ago that it 
would take only one nuclear weapon to destroy Israel. 
 
Overwhelmingly, Israel's political and military establishment 
want the rest of the world to act diplomatically or otherwise to 
stop Iran. But if that doesn't happen, then the impulse toward the 
use of force will become quite strong. 
 
For Israel, the "redline" is not so much when Iran has enough 
enrichment capacity for weapons-grade material. Their deadline 
is 18 months from now when Iran's air defense system, which is 
being upgraded by the Russians, will be completed. That will 
make it much more difficult to successfully strike Iran's nuclear 
capacity from the air. The closer we get to that window without 
resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem, the more Israel will 
feel compelled to strike. 
 
Clearly, at the moment, we are headed down the path of use of 
force. The slow-motion diplomacy of the West simply does not 
match the rapid development of Iran's nuclear capacity and the 
closing window when Iran's upgraded air defenses will be in 
place. 
 
… We are headed on a pathway now that will lead to the use of 
force. We don't want it to be that way. It doesn't have to be that 
way. There are alternatives, but the clock is ticking.68 
 
Israel is clearing preparing for an attack on Iran in extremis. As early 
as 2005, the Times of London reported that: 
 
Israel has drawn up secret plans for a combined air and ground 
attack on targets in Iran if diplomacy fails to halt the Iranian 
nuclear programme. The inner cabinet of Ariel Sharon, the 
Israeli prime minister, gave “initial authorisation” for an attack 
at a private meeting last month on his ranch in the Negev desert.  
Israeli forces have used a mock-up of Iran’s Natanz uranium 
enrichment plant in the desert to practise destroying it. Their 
tactics include raids by Israel’s elite Shaldag (Kingfisher) 
commando unit and airstrikes by F-15 jets from 69 Squadron, 
using bunker-busting bombs to penetrate underground 
facilities.69 
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In July 2007, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman stepped up 
the pressure, claiming EU and US support for eventual Israeli military 
action against Iran: 
 
“If we start military operations against Iran alone, then Europe 
and the US will support us,” Lieberman told Army Radio 
following a meeting earlier in the week with NATO and 
European Union officials. Lieberman said the Western powers 
acknowledged the severity of the Iranian nuclear threat to the 
Jewish state, but said that ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and 
Iraq are “going to prevent the leaders of 
countries in Europe and America from deciding on the use of 
force to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities,” even if diplomacy 
ultimately fails. The message Lieberman said the NATO and EU 
officials conveyed to him is that Israel should “prevent the threat 
herself.”70 
 
In addition, Israel possesses long range cruise missile firing 
submarines that can reach key targets in Iran from the Arabian sea. 
Israel’s war with Hizbullah in 2006 may have been prompted in part 
by the need to prepare for war with Iran, one of Hizbullah’s sponsors. 
The US director of national intelligence, John Negroponte, explained 
that the threat to launch Hizbullah against Israel was the main 
deterrent to a US attack on Iran. Although politically Hizbullah 
scored a major victory in holding off the Israeli army last summer, in 
fact it was badly damaged. 
 
Israel has obvious reasons for supporting efforts to stop the Iranian 
nuclear program in its tracks. Its concern about Iran stems from the 
country's proximity, its longstanding hostility to Israel, and its 
support for groups like Lebanese Hizbullah, Hamas, and Islamic 
Jihad. A nuclear Iran would also erode Israel's strategic edge, and 
even threaten the existence of the Jewish state. An Iranian bomb 
would, at least, negate the advantage Israel gains from having a 
military superior to any of its Middle East counterparts. Israel is also 
widely understood to have an arsenal of nuclear weapons. Israel 
clearly has a vital interest in preventing Iran obtaining nuclear 
weapons.  
 
Israeli special forces have a history of operating alongside US and 
other nations equivalent units, as well as a history of participating in 
counterproliferation missions. In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 
2003, the Times reported that: 
 
.. members of Sayeret Matkal, Israel’s commando force, are also 
said by Western military experts to have carried out covert 
reconnaissance operations inside the Western Iraqi desert. They 
are thought to be pre-empting a repeat of the first Gulf War 
when Saddam fired 39 Scuds at Israel.71  
 
Israeli special forces soldiers are also likely to be participating in 
intelligence gathering missions currently in Iran. 
 
Israel’s special forces are said to be operating inside Iran in an 
urgent attempt to locate the country’s secret uranium enrichment 
sites. “We found several suspected sites last year but there must 
be more,” an Israeli intelligence source said. They are operating 
from a base in northern Iraq, guarded by Israeli soldiers with 
the approval of the Americans, according to Israeli sources.72 
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According to some sources, the US and Israel are also training 
Iranian rebel groups to help destabilize the government: 
 
Now the U.S. military, with Israeli commandos lending a hand, 
is arming and secretly training a different breed of mujahideen, 
or Islamic fighters—Kurdish militias with links to ethnic Kurdish 
communities in Iran and Syria, and fighters from the Iranian 
Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), which has bases in southern Iraq 
and has provided the United States with information about the 
Iranian military and Iran’s nuclear sites.73 
 
There is also a possibility that Israel has been taking direct action 
against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. It has been alleged that Dr. 
Ardeshir Hosseinpour, a scientist involved in the Iranian nuclear 
program, was killed by Mossad on January 15, 2007. This claim 
was made by the private intelligence company, Stratfor.74 
Again, it is impossible to verify any of these specific claims, but the 
fact that some stories are leaking out indicates that some activity must 
be underway. 
 
A significant aim of Israeli political positions, intelligence revelations 
and preparations for an assault on Iranian nuclear facilities is to 
pressure the United States into taking action so that Israel need not do 
so. Clearly it would best suit Israeli needs for the United States to 
destroy the current Iranian government, and its nuclear and other 
military infrastructure. 
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Iran Policy in London: Would Brown Attack? 
Summary  
UK policy on Iran appeared to shift when Jack Straw was replaced 
by Margaret Beckett. Beckett’s refusal to rule out military action 
reversed the position put forward by Straw –if not Blair.  Beckett’s 
position has been reiterated by David Miliband, the new Foreign 
Secretary. 
Should the external political situation require it, it is likely that 
Brown would have enough votes in Parliament for UK support 
through the use of the British Indian Ocean Territory, Diego Garcia 
and even token military participation. 
Labour party discipline is such that only 11 MPs voted for an 
inquiry into the Iraq war as late as December 2006, while the 
Conservative Party is most unlikely to oppose British participation. 
The UK government has a clear position that Iran should not 
become a nuclear weapon state.  The ambiguity over Iran’s real 
nuclear programme in contrast to Iraq’s mythical programme and 
the simplicity of the claim to be preventing the ovens of Auschwitz 
arriving in Tel Aviv in the form of an Iranian nuclear bomb means 
that there is a powerful political message. 
One key caution is that regardless of the realities of Iran’s 
programme, the British public and elite may simply refuse to 
participate – almost out of bloody minded revenge for the Iraq 
deceit. 
Labour and other party positions 
In January 2005, Jack Straw visited Washington DC and obtained 
Bush administration support (however weak) for EU negotiations 
with Iran. He urged Condoleezza Rice, amongst others, to come 
round to his point of view that the time was not right for a military 
option. The price for US support was an EU endorsement, in the 
longer term, to keep all options on the table. According to 
governmental sources in London and Washington DC, Straw 
headed off what was serious mounting pressure for immediate 
military action against Iran. At the time, President Bush newly 
installed in his second term was riding high in the polls, and 
seemed untouchable. No Democrats were ready to criticize him on 
foreign affairs. Later, in mid-2006, Straw publicly ruled out the 
possibility of military action: Mr Straw, speaking on BBC1's 
Sunday AM Programme, stressed that the UK would not launch a 
pre-emptive strike on Iran, adding that he was as "certain as he 
could be" that neither would the US.  There was "no smoking gun" 
and therefore no justification for military action, he said.75 
While then-Prime Minister Tony Blair obviously supported this 
line, it was never possible to shake off the conviction that he 
would, if the time came, at least support a Bush attack on Iran – if 
not actually allow the UK military to participate. The position of 
the new Brown government has been laid out, if somewhat 
opaquely, by the new Foreign Secretary, David Milliband. 
Milliband has been keen to signal that he was not enthusiastic 
about the invasion of Iraq, His recent interview in the Financial 
Times leaves the situation unclear, although he refused to eliminate 
the possibility of using military force to disarm Iran: 
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FT: And military action? Is it conceivable? 
DM: I think that the whole of the international community wants 
a non-military diplomatic solution to this problem. 
FT: So it’s inconceivable? 
DM: Sorry? 
FT: Military action is inconceivable? 
DM: I stand totally four square behind what the prime minister 
has said on this, which is that we want a non-military solution to 
this, we are working very hard to achieve a non-military solution 
to this. I don’t think it does any good to speculate any wider than 
that. Our intent and our actions and our efforts are absolutely 
clear about the way we want to solve this. 
FT: But you’d understand that people might interpret that as 
leaving all options on the table?  
DM: I think that people should… I hope that people will come to 
see that they should look carefully at the words I use, and they 
should look at what I say, not at what I don’t say.Beyond this, the 
clues are few and far between. Privately, there are many reports 
that Brown has done all he can to alleviate worries in Washington 
DC that he will be a less positive ally than was Tony Blair, but 
those worries do exist – and the background briefings from 
Milliband and others disparaging Iraq policy will have done little to 
assuage American concerns. Indeed, the recent speech to the 
Council on Foreign Relations by Brown protégé, Douglas 
Alexander, and by Mark Mallach Brown have only heightened 
worries in Washington that Brown will be much less supportive of 
the Bush agenda than his predecessor.76 The Milliband response is 
clearly more equivocal than the statements of Condoleeza Rice and 
others, but does not rule out the use of force. At the same time, the 
UK has pressured the EU into taking a relatively hard stance in 
negotiations with Iran, and in taking action through the United 
Nations Security Council, and there is pressure to hold to a hard 
line. US Senator John McCain, noted for his view that the only 
thing worse than war with Iran is a nuclear Iran, was the guest 
speaker at the 2006 Conservative Party Conference where he was 
lauded as the next US President.  
The Conservative opposition leader, David Cameron, in May 2007 
called for a harder line on Iran:  
David Cameron today called for much tougher international 
sanctions against Iran to stop it developing nuclear weapons, 
and said military action should not be ruled out. The 
Conservative leader urged a "rapid" shift in policy, as current 
sanctions were "too weak to bring about a change in behaviour 
... Make no mistake, the threat is growing. The scale and urgency 
of our response needs to match it." 
 
Speaking at a press conference in London, Mr Cameron said 
tough measures were needed to prevent Iran becoming a nuclear 
power. "Tougher penalties means increasing the extent and 
scope of sanctions." He said the west needed to recognise "the 
current response to Iran's nuclear programme is not yet 
working". 
 
Britain should be pushing for tougher restrictions on individuals 
involved in Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the 
banning of new arms sales to Iran, and action to discourage 
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investment in its nuclear programme. 
Within the European Union, he called for limits on Iranian 
banks' access to the European financial system, restrictions on 
export credit guarantees, and action to restrict investment in gas 
and oil fields. 
 
Mr Cameron said the threat of military action against Iran could 
not be ruled out, as Jack Straw had done when he was foreign 
secretary. "I think Jack Straw made a mistake when he explicitly 
ruled it out. I don't that's sensible in international affairs and I 
wouldn't take that path. What we want to do is to avoid that 
happening. It would be a calamity if they get a nuclear weapon, 
but military action would be calamitous.77 
In January 2007, a report in the Independent stated that,  
‘Liam Fox MP, Conservative Defence Spokesman gave the 
clearest signal yet that the Conservatives would support military 
action, including the use of nuclear strikes by the US or Israel, to 
halt the alleged production of a nuclear weapon by Iran. 
"I am a hawk on Iran," said Mr Fox. "We should rule absolutely 
nothing out when it comes to Iran. His remarks follow reports in 
the US that Israel is ready to use nuclear "bunker buster" bombs 
to knock out the Iranian nuclear plants.’78  
Such senior support for nuclear war is reason enough to consider 
what such rhetoric might mean in practice, so a detailed analysis of an 
Anglo-American nuclear strike is included in this study. 
Relations between the UK and Iran are poor. Iran’s seizure of British 
sailors in the Persian Gulf still rankles greatly, even after the Iranian 
leadership asserted its control over the Revolutionary Guard to 
enforce their release. A steady flow of UK claims that Iran is fuelling 
and supplying the insurgency in southern Iran has worsened Tehran’s 
view of London. 
It is obvious that military strikes against Iran would not be the policy 
of choice for Brown and his team. However, as with Iraq, there may 
not be a choice, and the course of action that they would pursue if 
informed that the US will attack whether or not the UK offers support 
remains unknown. 
Shaping public opinion 
Iran has gradually become more and more of a “threat” in the media 
over that last three years. Numerous former British military, 
diplomatic and intelligence officials have told the authors that they 
regard the information management as uncannily similar to the lead 
up to the Iraq war. Newspapers owned by Rupert Murdoch and by the 
Barclay Brothers in the UK have begun to call for war with Iran. 
One clear result of the perceived humiliation of the vaunted Royal 
Navy at the hands of Iran is that in the next confrontation, the British 
public will want a far more robust reaction from the heirs of Lord 
Nelson, their belligerence will be formed in ignorance of the scale of 
the war already in preparation. 
Military participation 
The British government sent additional naval vessels to the Gulf 
when the US added a second Carrier Strike Force to its fleet in the 
Gulf in early 2007. These vessels included anti-mine vessels. As 
discussed elsewhere in this study there are fragmentary accounts of 
UK participation in special operations inside Iraq and in exercises for 
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an attack. Iran makes repeated allegations of UK involvement in 
attacks inside Iran, and most recently claimed that Britain ran a 
training base in Jordan for Iranians wishing to fight the regime in 
Tehran.79 However, it is unclear how far UK officials and military 
staff are briefed on overall US planning for Iran. The British Indian 
Ocean Territory, Diego Garcia, would be a vital base in any attack.  
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How Might Iran Respond to Attack: 
And How Could This Affect the Gulf States and Combatants 
While states in the region are by far the best able to assess likely 
consequences of a war with Iran for themselves, some conclusions 
can be drawn. Iran has military and political cards it is able to play, 
and the military and economic consequences could be significant, 
even disastrous. 
If the United States were to attack Iran, even in a fairly limited series 
of air attacks aimed at a small number of nuclear-related targets, Iran 
is certain to fight back. It would have both military and political 
options for pre-emption or retaliation. Most of these have been 
considered above and the authors conclude that a US strike is unlikely 
to leave the Iranian regime and state intact. 
Military options 
Indeed, it is possible that Iran would be able to predict a coming 
attack and begin hostilities itself. As the Atlantic Monthly wrote in 
2004: 
Thomas Hammes, the Marine expert in counterinsurgency, said 
.. "We never 'red-celled' the enemy in this exercise" (that is, let 
him have the first move), Hammes said after the Iran war game. 
"What if they try to pre-empt us? What if we threaten them, and 
the next day we find mines in Baltimore Harbor and the Golden 
Gate, with a warning that there will be more? .. Its leaders 
would have every incentive to strike pre-emptively in their own 
defense. Unlike Saddam Hussein's Iraq, a threatened Iran would 
have many ways to harm America and its interests. Apart from 
cross-border disruptions in Iraq, it might form an outright 
alliance with al-Qaeda to support major new attacks within the 
United States. It could work with other oil producers to punish 
America economically. It could, as Hammes warned, apply the 
logic of "asymmetric," or "fourth-generation," warfare, in which 
a superficially weak adversary avoids a direct challenge to U.S. 
military power and instead strikes the most vulnerable points in 
American civilian society, as al-Qaeda did on 9/11. If it thought 
that the U.S. goal was to install a wholly new regime rather than 
to change the current regime's behavior, it would have no 
incentive for restraint.80 
That Iran would seek to destabilize Iraq, and hit out at US forces and 
interest there, is a common assumption amongst analysts and 
planners. Iran has close links with Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi 
Army; helped form and trained the Badr brigades, which fought 
against Saddam and have now mostly been absorbed into security 
forces in Basra and other areas of southern Iraq; as well as with the 
Dawa Party of prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and with many other 
politicians. Their ability to send Revolutionary Guards and others into 
Iraq to work with their allies and foment a major uprising against the 
coalition forces there should not be understated. It is also likely that 
Iranian allies in Afghanistan would carry out similar actions, although 
on a much smaller scale.  
Most analysts also assume that Iran would also push Hezbollah to 
attack Israel and look for other ways to hit back. The Center for Non-
proliferation Studies published just such an analysis: 
On July 5, 2004, during a visit to Hamedan in western Iran, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told a crowd of thousands: "the United 
States says that we have endangered their interests... if anyone 
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invades our nation, we will jeopardize their interests around the 
world." In December 2003, Iran's Air Force Commander 
General Seyed Reza Pardis, said in response to statements by 
Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz that if Israel attacks Iran it 
will be "digging its own grave."  Considering the extensive 
financial and national policy investment Iran has committed to 
its nuclear projects, it is almost certain that an attack by Israel 
or the United States would result in immediate retaliation. A 
likely scenario includes an immediate Iranian missile 
counterattack on Israel and U.S. bases in the Gulf, followed by a 
very serious effort to destabilize Iraq and foment all-out 
confrontation between the United States and Iraq's Shi'i 
majority. Iran could also opt to destabilize Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf states with a significant Shi'i population, and induce 
Lebanese Hizbullah to launch a series of rocket attacks on 
Northern Israel.81 
Iranian missile attacks are to be feared. Iran is thought to have around 
500 missiles capable of delivering high explosives, chemical or 
biological weapons to Israel and to US allies in the Gulf States. As 
the CNS says: 
.. the destructive potential of these ballistic missile systems 
should not be underestimated. Although these Scud variants are 
relatively inaccurate - they are certainly incapable of the 
pinpoint accuracy associated with U.S. cruise missiles and 
guided munitions - they do have much greater accuracy and 
higher payloads than the Iraqi al-Husseins that turned out a 
mediocre CEP (circular error probability) of 1 to 3km in 1991. 
Multiple missiles attacks on U.S. or Israeli targets carrying 
large warheads can potentially be very deadly, as demonstrated 
by an Iraqi Scud attack on barracks in Saudi Arabia in early 
1991. It turned out to be the deadliest such incident of the entire 
war for U.S. troops, killing 28 and injuring 98.82 
However as discussed in the section “Scud Hunt” above such attacks 
would not be decisive in the war. They might be able, if not 
neutralized, to cause significant economic damage in the Gulf region. 
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All infrastructure for oil and gas production, refinement and supply is 
vulnerable to attack by missile, by Revolutionary Guard or other 
military attack, or from sabotage by Iranian sleeper cells that could be 
activated in the event of war. Iran would likely try to make the most 
of its power to wreak economic havoc in the region that would have 
the effect of harming the US and western economies. 
Other important infrastructure, including airports, ports, roads, power 
generation facilities and others would be at risk in such a scenario. 
There is substantial risk of economic dislocation. 
Even without major Iranian attacks on Gulf States, the fact of a war 
would have the effect of disrupting the region’s economy, at least 
temporarily. Civil airlines would likely halt flights into and through 
the region while any military air campaign was underway. Insurance 
rates for planes and ships transporting passengers or goods through 
the region would be raised significantly. 
Iran would also attempt to disrupt and attempt to stop oil supplies 
leaving the Gulf and the region as a whole if it were attacked, as 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei indicated last year “If the U.S. makes 
a wrong move against Iran, energy flow in the region will be 
definitely put at serious risk”, Khamenei said in a speech aired on 
state television. “You can never maintain security for [the flow of] 
energy in the region”, the Supreme Leader said in comments directed 
at the U.S. “We are committed to our ideals and national interests and 
if anyone threatens our national interests it will face the Iranian 
nations’ wrath”.83 This could be achieved through mining the Gulf, 
attacking oil tankers, destroying oil pipelines across the region, and 
bombing or firing missiles against oil production and refining 
facilities in proximity to Iran. While a military action the prime effect 
of such disruption would be economic, likely causing a massive rise 
in the price of oil on world markets with the ensuing possibility of 
global recession as a possible consequence. 
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As noted above, Iran could also attempt to internally destabilize Gulf 
States in the event of war. A report in the Daily Telegraph states that: 
Iran has trained secret networks of agents across the Gulf states 
to attack Western interests and incite civil unrest in the event of 
a military strike against its nuclear programme, a former 
Iranian diplomat has told The Sunday Telegraph. Spies working 
as teachers, doctors and nurses at Iranian-owned schools and 
hospitals have formed sleeper cells ready to be "unleashed" at 
the first sign of any serious threat to Teheran, it is claimed. 
Trained by Iranian intelligence services, they are also said to be 
recruiting fellow Shias in the region..84 
Such mobilization could range from small sleeper cells attempting 
minor economic sabotage to an attempt to foment major 
demonstrations and unrest.  
Attacks on Military Targets 
Iran would also be in a position to attack US naval forces in the 
Persian Gulf and surrounding area: 
In wartime, Iranian naval forces would seek to close the Strait of 
Hormuz and destroy enemy forces bottled up in the Persian Gulf; 
therefore speed and surprise would be key. Iranian naval forces 
would seek to identify and attack the enemy’s centers of gravity 
as quickly as possible and inflict maximum losses before contact 
with subordinate units were lost as a result of enemy 
counterattacks. Geography is Iran’s ally. Because of the 
proximity of major shipping routes to the country’s largely 
mountainous 2,000-kilometer coastline, Iranian naval elements 
can sortie from their bases and attack enemy ships with little 
advance warning. Meanwhile, shore-based antiship missiles can 
engage targets almost anywhere in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf 
of Oman. To achieve the latter capability, and to improve the 
survivability of its shore-based missile force, Iran has devoted 
significant efforts to extending the range of locally produced 
variants of a number of Chinese shore-based antiship missiles 
such as the HY-2 Silkworm and the C-802 (from 50 to 300 
kilometers and from 120 to 170 kilometers, respectively). It has 
also introduced the use of helicopter-borne long-range antiship 
missiles.  
The section above on Littoral warfare indicates that the US has a 
strong technical, and physical military ability to preempt, destroy 
and defend against Iranian attacks of this sort. 
To ensure that it can achieve surprise in the event of a crisis or 
war, Iran’s naval forces keep U.S. warships in the region under 
close visual, acoustic, and radar observation. The Iranian navy 
commander—Rear Adm. Sajad Kouchaki, one of the architects of 
the country’s naval doctrine—recently claimed that Iranian 
submarines continually monitor U.S. naval movements, 
frequently at close range, and have even passed underneath 
American aircraft carriers and other warships undetected. 
Iranian UAVs also frequently shadow U.S. carrier battle groups 
in the area.85 
Indeed, however the US does exactly the same, with far greater 
resources.  
One factor for states in the region to consider is the extent to which 
these Iranian attacks, and requirements for US military assistance 
to guard against them, risk linking those states to the US action. At 
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the very least, there will need to be GCC acquiescence in an attack 
on Iran for the use of US facilities in the region, for the use of 
territorial waters and for overflights. If Iran manages to attack US 
or regional bases, facilities, or civilian infrastructure, then regional 
states risk a much deeper involvement in any ongoing war. 
Possible Political Actions by Iran 
In addition to military responses to a US or Israeli attack, Iran has 
political recourse as well.  The first response would be to gather 
domestic and international support. It is likely that all elements of 
Iranian society would gather around the current government, 
opposing US action, and supporting a fully fledged nuclear program. 
And Iran, would be able to benefit from the attack to dramatically 
accelerate its activities in this field, just as Iraq did after the Israeli 
strike on the Osiraq reactor in 1981. The Center for Non-Proliferation 
Studies argues that:  
In the event of an unprovoked preemptive attack on its nuclear 
facilities, Iran could justifiably argue that it requires nuclear 
weapons to guard against aggression and protect its sovereignty, 
effectively announcing its intention to withdraw from the NPT 
and altering the current international dynamic. Especially given 
the recent lack of substantiation in the Iraqi WMD case, such a 
strike would undoubtedly result in U.S. or Israeli diplomatic 
isolation.  
The practical diplomatic consequences of a preemptive attack in 
Iran are worth considering. In the aftermath of such a strike, it is 
highly unlikely that the United States would be able to convince 
members of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on 
Iran. Without international sanctions, Iran will be able to 
allocate greater financial and human resources to its nuclear 
program. If the Iraqi Osirak example is any indication, the size 
of Iran's nuclear program would probably increase 
dramatically, as the Iranian government touts an expanded 
nuclear program as the key to deterring Iran's enemies.  
This like much similar analysis presumes that Iran would remain as 
a functioning central state after a US attack. 
Since Russia and China oppose all but the mildest sanctions, it is 
likely that they would turn against the US in the event of a unilateral 
attack. The European Union would also be unable to support such a 
move. The Non-Aligned Movement has supported Iran’s right to 
nuclear technology for civilian purposes and would undoubtedly rally 
round Iran in the event of an attack. In short, the United States would 
find itself almost completely diplomatically isolated, whereas Iran 
would have its hands untied. 
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Conclusion  
The study concludes that the US has made the military preparations to 
destroy Iran’s WMD, nuclear energy, regime, armed forces, state 
apparatus and economic infrastructure within days, if not hours, of 
President George Bush giving the order. 
This report is focused on the prospect of the possible attempted 
destruction of the Iranian regime and state by the United States and 
its allies. It neither examines the realities of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, the negotiations between Iran and the international 
community nor does it examine in detail the human, political, 
economic and environmental consequences of such an attack. 
Nevertheless a number of conclusions can be reached. 
1. If the attack is “successful” and the US reasserts its global 
military dominance and reduces Iran to the status of an oil-
rich failed state, then the risks to humanity in general and to 
the states of the Middle East are grave indeed. 
The two world wars of 1914-18 and 1939-1945, the creation of 
nuclear weapons, and the advent of global warming have created 
successive lessons that humanity and states cannot prosper or 
survive long unless they hold their security in common-sharing 
sovereignty and power to ensure both survival and prosperity. 
A “successful” US attack, without UN authorisation, would return 
the world to the state that existed in the period before the war of 
1914-18, but with nuclear weapons. 
The self-styled realists argue that this is an inevitable and 
manageable world, the naivety of imagining a nuclear armed 
world without nuclear war is utopian in the extreme. 
States and regimes in the region may consider that in the short-run 
they would benefit from the implosion of Iran and the eclipse of 
Shiia power. However, the threat from within from disaffected 
elements outraged at further unabashed Western militarism is 
likely to threaten crowns and republics alike. Hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqi deaths have had no electoral cost to American 
and British leaders, the same number of Iranian deaths may have 
equally little impact in the West, but it is unimaginable that it 
would not cause far greater spurs to anger than already exist in the 
region. 
The impact of on Turkey of an autonomous Iranian and Iraqi 
territory of Kurdistan is hard to overestimate. 
2. If the attack is pursued with the skill of the Iraq campaign 
then the we face major and unpredictable escalation arising 
from the fallacy of attempting to make “the last move” on the 
political game board. Should Iranians rally to their battered 
state regardless of their, then what has been seen in Iraq will 
merely become an overture to a larger regional war, and one 
where a blip in oil prices becomes a prolonged global 
recession. Regional instability that might follow “victory” will 
be magnified. The Shakespearean quote, “cry havoc and let 
loose the dogs of war” expresses the simple rule that wars, 
like fires are far easier to start than to contain or put out. 
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1
 “About ten days after 9/11, I went through the Pentagon and I saw Secretary 
Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. I went downstairs just to say hello to 
some of the people on the Joint Staff who used to work for me, and one of the 
generals called me in. He said, “Sir, you’ve got to come in and talk to me a 
second.” I said, “Well, you’re too busy.” He said, “No, no.” He says, “We’ve made 
the decision we’re going to war with Iraq.” This was on or about the 20th of 
September. I said, “We’re going to war with Iraq? Why?” He said, “I don’t know.” 
He said, “I guess they don’t know what else to do.” So I said, “Well, did they find 
some information connecting Saddam to al-Qaeda?” He said, “No, no.” He says, 
“There’s nothing new that way. They just made the decision to go to war with 
Iraq.” He said, “I guess it’s like we don’t know what to do about terrorists, but 
we’ve got a good military and we can take down governments.” And he said, “I 
guess if the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem has to look like a nail.” 
So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in 
Afghanistan. I said, “Are we still going to war with Iraq?” And he said, “Oh, it’s 
worse than that.” He reached over on his desk. He picked up a piece of paper. And 
he said, “I just got this down from upstairs” -- meaning the Secretary of Defense’s 
office -- “today.” And he said, “This is a memo that describes how we’re going 
to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, 
Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran.” I said, “Is it 
classified?” He said, “Yes, sir.” I said, “Well, don’t show it to me.” And I saw him 
a year or so ago, and I said, “You remember that?” He said, “Sir, I didn’t show you 
that memo! I didn’t show it to you!” (emphasis added) 
General Wesley Clark, March 2nd 2007, describing a conversation in the Pentagon 
in September 2001on www.democracynow.org 
N.B. Since 2001 of the seven countries mentioned; The regime has been changed in 
Iraq, Lebanon and Somalia. The Libyan government has changed orientation an 
aligned with the West. The positions of the Sudan and Syrian governments have 
weakened. Iran remains defiant. 
2
 Daniel Plesch, Next Target Tehran, The Guardian, 15 January 2007. 
3
 Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD-1) 
                                                                                                                 
4
 A full documentation of the establishmentof the US Global Strike system can be 
found at http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/GlobalStrikeReport.pdf  
5
 More details about MOP can be found at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/dshtw.htm.  
6
 Further analysis of global strike capabilities with reference to a war with Iran can 
be found at http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/10_1_09.html.  
7
 There are a variety of media reports for the MOP development program. These 
include http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20078623938.asp; 
http://www.domain-b.com/aero/july/2007/20070724_penetration.htm;  
8
 Further analysis of global strike capabilities with reference to a war with Iran can 
be found at http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/10_1_09.html.  
9
 This thinking is backed up by the September 2006 Time magazine article which 
gave some details of the likely military operations the United States was planning 
for in an attack on Iran. It reported that “No one is talking about a ground invasion 
of Iran. Too many U.S. troops are tied down elsewhere to make it possible, and 
besides, it isn't necessary. If the U.S. goal is simply to stunt Iran's nuclear program, 
it can be done better and more safely by air. An attack limited to Iran's nuclear 
facilities would nonetheless require a massive campaign. Experts say that Iran has 
between 18 and 30 nuclear-related facilities. The sites are dispersed around the 
country - some in the open, some cloaked in the guise of conventional factories, 
some buried deep underground. A Pentagon official says that among the known 
sites there are 1,500 different "aim points," which means the campaign could well 
require the involvement of almost every type of aircraft in the U.S. arsenal: Stealth 
bombers and fighters, B-1s and B-2s, as well as F-15s and F-16s operating from 
land and F-18s from aircraft carriers. GPS-guided munitions and laser-targeted 
bombs - sighted by satellite, spotter aircraft and unmanned vehicles - would do 
most of the bunker busting. But because many of the targets are hardened under 
several feet of reinforced concrete, most would have to be hit over and over to 
ensure that they were destroyed or sufficiently damaged. The U.S. would have to 
mount the usual aerial ballet, refueling tankers as well as search-and-rescue 
helicopters in case pilots were shot down by Iran's aging but possibly still effective 
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air defenses. U.S. submarines and ships could launch cruise missiles as well, but 
their warheads are generally too small to do much damage to reinforced concrete - 
and might be used for secondary targets. An operation of that size would hardly be 
surgical. Many sites are in highly populated areas, so civilian casualties would be a 
certainty.( Michael Duffy, What Would War Look Like?, Time Magazine, 17 
Spetember 2006.) 
10
 The Air Combat Information Group (www.acig.org, an independent analysis 
group producing information on air warfare since 1945) analyzed the potential for 
this kind of scenario in 2003. “The core target set for both minimal and maximal 
operations would be the Iranian nuclear industry. Attacks on Iran’s air defences 
would not seek to cause long-term degradation, though any maximal plan would 
require a broader range of air defence targets to be struck. Beyond this, the two 
concepts of operations diverge. A maximal operation might embrace a wider strike 
against known or suspected non-nuclear elements of the weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) programme, such as alleged biological weapons centres 
recently designated by the Iranian opposition – the Mojaheddin-e Khalq 
Organisation (MKO). As in Desert Fox, the US may strike delivery systems – 
strategic missiles and long-range aircraft – as a means of setting back Iran’s 
overarching capability to deploy WMD. Unlike Israel, the US would have a 
responsibility to screen its own deployed forces in the Gulf and the maritime assets 
and homelands of regional allies from any Iranian response. This could draw the 
US into strikes on anti-shipping missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, and naval 
forces. The US could also launch counter-terrorism strikes against the sections of 
Iran’s government accused of sponsoring terrorism – the Ministry of Intelligence 
and Security (MOIS) and the Quds sections of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps 
(IRGC) – or in response to actionable intelligence that located Al Qaeda or 
Hezbollah leadership figures in Iran. A maximal air operation in Iran would thus 
have great potential for ‘mission creep’, with an ever-broadening number of 
systems filling out the target list. Dr. Michael Knights, Hard Target: Rolling-Back 
Iranian Nuclear Programmes, Arabian Peninsula & Persian Gulf Database, Air 
Combat Information Group, 18 December 2003. Available at 
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/printer_398.shtml on 17 January 2007. 
                                                                                                                 
11
 Cordesman: Possible US War Plans: Attacking. Delaying, andWaiting Out 
If the US does choose to respond militarily, it has several major types of military and 
strategic options. Each of these options might have many of the following broad 
characteristics, although it should be stressed that these are only rough outlines of US 
options and are purely speculative and illustrative points. They are more warnings than 
recommendations, and they are not based on any inside knowledge of actual US war 
plans, and calculations. Those who argue strongly for and against such options should 
note, however, that there are many different ways in which the US could act. There are 
no rules or certainties that either say such attacks could not succeed or that they would. 
Demonstrative, Coercive, or Deterrent Strikes 
1. Conduct a few cruise missile or stealth strikes simply as a demonstration or warning of the 
seriousness of US intentions if Iran does not comply with the terms of the EU3 or UN. 
2. Hit at least one high value target recognized by IAEA and EU3 to show credibility to Iran, 
minimize international criticism. 
3. Might strike at new sites and activities to show Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expand its 
efforts, by ignoring the UN or EU3. 
4. Could carrier base; would not need territory of Gulf ally. 
5. International reaction would be a problem regardless of the level of US action. 
6. Might trigger Iranian counteraction in Iraq, Afghanistan, and dealing with Hezbollah. 
Limited US attacks: 
1. Limited strike would probably take 16-20 Cruise missile and strike sorties. (Total sorties in Gulf 
and area would probably have to total 100 or more including escorts, enablers, and refuelers. 
2. Might be able to combine B-2s and carrier-based aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles. Might 
well need land base(s) in Gulf for staging, refueling, and recovery. 
3. Goal would be at least 2-3 of most costly and major facilities critically damaged or destroyed. 
 71 
                                                                                                                 
4. Hit at high value targets recognized by IAEA and EU3 to show credibility to Iran, minimize 
international criticism. 
5. Might strike at new sites and activities to show Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expand its 
efforts, by ignoring the UN or EU3. 
6. Might slow down Iran if used stealth aircraft to strike at hard and underground targets, -but impact 
over time would probably still be more demonstrative than crippling. 
7. Hitting hard and underground targets could easily require multiple strikes during mission, and 
follow-on restrikes to be effective. 
8. Battle damage would be a significant problem, particularly for large buildings and underground 
facilities. 
9. Size and effectiveness would depend very heavily on the quality of US intelligence, and suitability 
of given ordnance, as well as the time the US sought to inflict a given effect. 
10. Iran's technology base would survive; the same would be true of much of equipment even in 
facilities hit with strikes. Little impact, if any, on pool of scientists and experts. 
11. Iranian response in terms of proliferation could vary sharply and unpredictably: Deter and delay 
vs. mobilize and provoke. 
12. Likely to produce cosmetic Iranian change in behavior at best. Would probably make Iran 
disperse 
program even more, and drive it to deep underground facilities. Might provoke to implement 
(more) active biological warfare program. 
13. Any oil embargo likely to be demonstrative. 
14. Would probably trigger Iranian counteraction in Iraq, Afghanistan, and dealing with Hezbollah. 
15. International reaction could be a serious problem; US might well face same level of political 
problems as if it had launched a comprehensive strike on Iranian facilities. 
Major US attacks on Iranian CBRN and major missile targets: 
1. 200-600 cruise missiles and strike sorties; would have to be at least a matching number of escorts, 
                                                                                                                 
enablers, and refuelers. Period of attacks could extend from 3 to 10 days. 
2. Hit all suspect facilities for nuclear, missile, BW, and related C4IBM. 
3. Knock out key surface-to-air missile sites and radars for future freedom of action 
4. Would need to combine B-2s, carrier-based aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles, and used of 
land base(s) in Gulf for staging, refueling, and recovery. 
5. Threaten to strike extensively at Iranian capabilities for asymmetric warfare and to threaten tanker 
traffic, facilities in the Gulf, and neighboring states. 
6. At least 7-10 days to fully execute and validate. 
7. Goal would be at least 70-80% of most costly and major facilities critically damaged or destroyed. 
8. Hit at all high value targets recognized by IAEA and EU3 to show credibility to Iran, minimize 
international criticism, but also possible sites as well. 
9. Strike at all known new sites and activities to show Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expand 
its efforts, unless hold back some targets as hostages to the future. 
10. Impact over time would probably be crippling, but Iran might still covertly assemble some nuclear 
device and could not halt Iranian biological weapons effort. 
11. Hitting hard and underground targets could easily require multiple strikes during mission, and 
follow-on restrikes to be effective. 
12. Battle damage would be a significant problem, particularly for large buildings and underground 
facilities. 
13. Size and effectiveness would depend very heavily on the quality of US intelligence and suitability 
of given ordnance, as well as the time the US sought to inflict a given effect. 
14. Much of Iran's technology base would still survive; the same would be true of many equipment 
items, even in facilities hit with strikes. Some impact, if any, on pool of scientists and experts. 
15. Iranian response in terms of proliferation could vary sharply and unpredictably: Deter and delay 
vs. mobilize and provoke. 
16. A truly serious strike may be enough of a deterrent to change Iranian behavior, particularly if 
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coupled to the threat of follow on strikes in the future. It still, however, could as easily produce 
only a cosmetic Iranian change in behavior at best. Iran might still disperse its program even more, 
and shift to multiple, small, deep underground facilities. 
17. Might well provoke Iran to implement (more) active biological warfare program. 
18. An oil embargo might be serious. 
19. Iranian government could probably not prevent some elements in Iranian forces and intelligence 
from seeking to use Iraq, Afghanistan, support of terrorism, and Hezbollah to hit back at the US 
and its allies if it tried; it probably would not try. 
20. International reaction would be a serious problem, but the US might well face same level of 
political problems as if it had launched a small strike on Iranian facilities. 
Major US attacks on military and related civilian targets: 
1. 1000-2,500 cruise missiles and strike sorties 
2. Hit all suspect facilities for nuclear, missile, BW, and C4IBM, and potentially “technology base” 
targets including universities, dual use facilities. 
3. Either strike extensively at Iranian capabilities for asymmetric warfare and to threaten tanker 
traffic, facilities in the Gulf, and neighboring states or threaten to do so if Iran should deploy for 
such action. 
4. Would require a major portion of total US global assets. Need to combine B-2s, other bombers, 
and carrier-based aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles. Would need land base(s) in Gulf for 
staging, refueling, and recovery. Staging out of Diego Garcia would be highly desirable. 
5. Would probably take several weeks to two months to fully execute and validate. 
6. Goal would be 70-80%-plus of most costly and major CBRN, missile and other delivery systems, 
key conventional air and naval strike assets, and major military production facilities critically 
damaged or destroyed. 
7. Hit at all high value targets recognized by IAEA and EU3 to show credibility to Iran, minimize 
international criticism, but also possible sites as well. 
                                                                                                                 
8. Strike at all known new sites and activities to show Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expand 
its efforts, unless hold back some targets as hostages to the future. 
9. Hitting hard and underground targets could easily require multiple strikes during mission, and 
follow-on restrikes to be effective. 
10. Impact over time would probably be crippling, but Iran might still covertly assemble some nuclear 
device and could not halt Iranian biological weapons effort. 
11. Battle damage would be a significant problem, particularly for large buildings and underground 
facilities. 
12. Size and effectiveness would depend very heavily on the quality of US intelligence and suitability 
of given ordnance, as well as the time the US sought to inflict a given effect. 
13. Much of Iran's technology base would still survive; the same would be true of many equipment 
items, even in facilities hit with strikes. Some impact, if any, on pool of scientists and experts. 
14. Iranian response in terms of proliferation could vary sharply and unpredictably: Deter and delay 
vs. mobilize and provoke. 
15. Such a series of strikes might be enough of a deterrent to change Iranian behavior, particularly if 
coupled to the threat of follow on strikes in the future. It still, however, could as easily produce 
only a cosmetic Iranian change in behavior at best. Iran might still disperse its program even more, 
and shift to multiple, small, deep underground facilities. 
16. Might well provoke Iran to implement (more) active biological warfare program. 
17. An oil embargo might be serious. 
18. Iranian government could probably not prevent some elements in Iranian forces and intelligence 
from seeking to use Iraq, Afghanistan, support of terrorism, and Hezbollah to hit back at the US 
and its allies if it tried; it probably would not try. 
19. International reaction would be a serious problem, and far greater than strikes that could be 
clearly 
associated with Iran's efforts to proliferate. 
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Delay and then strike: 
1. The US could execute any of the above options, and wait until after Iran provided proof was 
proliferating. Such a “smoking gun” would create a much higher chance of allied support, and 
international tolerance or consensus 
2. Iran will have committed major resources, and created much higher value targets 
3. The counter-risk is an unanticipated Iranian break out; some form of Iranian launch on warning 
(LOW), launch under attack (LUA), or survivable “ride out” capability. 
4. Iranian dispersal and sheltering may be much better. 
5. Iran might have biological weapons as a counter 
6. Allied and regional reactions would be uncertain. Time tends to breed tolerance of proliferation. 
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is true. We can't guarantee the results. But what we can do is demonstrate, to the 
mullahs and to others elsewhere, that even with these uncertainties, in a post-9/11 
world the United States has red lines that will compel it to act. And one 
nonnegotiable red line is that we will not sit idly and watch a virulently anti-
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clerical elite wants a head-on collision with a determined superpower, then that's 
their choice.  
“No matter what happens, it is long overdue for the Bush administration to get 
serious about building clandestine mechanisms to support Iranians who want to 
change their regime. This will take time and be brutally difficult. And overt 
democracy support to Iranians—which is the Bush administration's current game 
plan—isn't likely to draw many recruits. Most Iranians probably know that this 
approach is a one-way invitation to Evin prison, which isn't the most effective place 
for expressing dissent. However we go about assisting the opposition, the prospects 
for removing the regime before it acquires nuclear weapons are slim.  
“So we will all have to wait for President Bush to decide whether nuclear weapons 
in the hands of Khamenei, Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad, and the Revolutionary Guards 
Corps are something we can live with. Given the Islamic Republic's dark history, 
the burden of proof ought to be on those who favor accommodating a nuclear Iran. 
Those who are unwilling to accommodate it, however, need to be honest and admit 
that diplomacy and sanctions and covert operations probably won't succeed, and 
that we may have to fight a war—perhaps sooner rather than later—to stop such 
evil men from obtaining the worst weapons we know.”  
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By David Frum | April 18, 2006  
“If there is to be any hope of avoiding a U.S.-Iranian war, the U.S. and its friends 
have to act now to stop the confrontation from working for the mullahs—and start 
making it work against them.  
“That would begin with recognizing that the Iranians do fear the United States and 
do fear war—and that the more credible the threat of an American strike is, the 
better the hopes for a negotiated end. Which in turn means that America's friends 
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